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Strikes more than doubled in 1994 
There was a huge upsurge in the number of labour disputes and strikes in Indonesia's major indus-
trial cities in 1994. The independent union, the SBSI, has come under extreme pressure from a 
'bleeding to death' strategy by the authorities, and another independent union has emerged. Mean-
while, inspired by the spirit of struggle of Indonesian workers, international support has intensified. 
The struggle of the SBSI 
After mock trials and unconscionable verdicts for Much-
tar Pakpahan and other leaders of the SBSI, the Indonesian 
Prosperity Trade Union, the Indonesian press has recently 
reported nothing about this independent union. Although 
difficult to prove, it seems likely that a blackout has been 
ordered by the authorities, part of a deliberate strategy to har-
ass and isolate the union. 
It is apparent that the authorities have developed a new 
strategy, not simply a blanket ban but a 'bleeding to death' 
strategy. After jailing many of the SBSJ ' s important leaders, 
the union's bank accounts were frozen. Visitors to the SBSJ 
office are harassed by intelligence officers. The press blackout 
is part of this strategy. · 
During the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation summit, 
when Indonesia was determined to appear to its important 
guests as an orderly country, board members of the SBSI were 
visited by intelligence officers and warned not even to con-
template organising any protests. Despite these harassments, 
the SBSJ office in Jakarta has continued to function. But these 
difficulties, not least its inability to use its funds in the bank, 
have curtailed the development of SBSJ branches in the re-
gions. 
This year will be a test for SBSJ to see whether it is strong 
enough to withstand government persecution. It is likely that 
military intelligence will try to infiltrate the union so as to 
create disunity. This happened some years ago to the SBM, an 
independent union set up in 1990. In the meantime, interna-
tional support for SBSJ is growing, as reflected in the resolu-
tion of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
at its Executive Board meeting in Brussels in December. 
The emergence of a new union 
With so much labour unrest all over the country and the 
inability of the government-sponsored union, the SPSI, to 
defend the workers, there have been more organisational ini-
tiatives. On 22-23 October in Ambarawa, Central Java, about 
a hundred delegates representing workers' committees in 
Jakarta, Tangerang, Bogor, Yogyakarta, Semarang, Solo, 
Salatiga, Surabaya and Medan set up a new trade union, the 
PPB! (Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia, Centre for Indo-
nesian Workers ' Struggle). This is the third independent un-
ion to emerge after the SBM, the Solidarity Union, and the 
SBSJ. The event was ignored by the press. PPB! members 
have been involved in several strikes and the union claims to 
represent between 10,000 and 15,000 workers. 
The congress adopted a general programme and a pro-
gramme of demands. The general programme covers burning 
issues like the struggle for wages and special allowances, 
improved health and safety standards, the right to organise, 
free assembly and speech, the repeal of all anti-worker regu-
lations and an end to military intervention in labour conflicts. 
The programme of demands includes a national daily mini-
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mum wage of Rp 5,000 (US$ 2.30). It calls for the repeal 
of regulations allowing only one union to exist and imple-
mentation of minimum redundancy payments. The new union 
grew out of workers' committees that had been set up in dif-
ferent factories. Having developed experience in organising 
strikes, the workers then decided to establish the PPBI. 
Marsinah case must be re-opened 
. . ·. . ·.,.· .. · 
A decision by the High Couit in East Java. to q\Jash the 
1 
17-year sentence for Yudi Susailto who· was accused -0fhavJ 
; ing masterminded the murder of Marsinah; the woman work· 
ers' leader, has discredited the entire case as con~cted bY 
I the police and the prosecution, clearly W()rking at . the behest 
' of the army. Nine people . were . f9Und guilty or otrences)n 
connection with Marsinah's mu:rder in May; 1993, whose 
, mutilated body was found · sever~ .. days after ·she . had led a 
1 strike . at a watch-making fa,ct()ry; All the a~· but . one, a· 
low-ranking army offieer, were part or ·ihe J:rianagemeilt .of 
security fortes at the factory; Yildi Susanto himself was the 
proprietor~ . The sentences ranged: from rune :months · for ·· the 
woman personnel manager . to ·the 17 .· years given fo •· Yudi. 
Several company employees gOt: ten years or more. ·. 
Numerous irregularities were exposed whil~ the trials 
were in progress. [See TAPOL Bulletins in .Nos JlO and 122; 
December 1993 and April 1994.] The accused had allbeen 
abducted by the military for nineteen days, subjected to tor-
ture and forced to sign confessions .about tlicir complicity in 
the murder. The courts ignonxt their decisions to retract 
written confessions although they were able to prove ·that 
they had been maltreated. 
The Legal Aid Institute undertook its owninvestigations 
which pointed to military involvement The trials Were given 
much prominence in the national media anci criticised by 
many lawyers. The goveirunertt-appoi:Qted National · Ct>Iil:-
mission for Human Right$ also cntici~ the trials and called 
for a review of the judicial pracess. · . .· . . . 
The police and the prosecutors involVed in the trials have · 
strongly resisted any re-consideration of the case and are even 
trying to have the High Courfverdict quashing Yudi ' s sen;:. 
tence reversed, although by law,~. verdict·aeqlJittinga ·defel}'.' 
dant cannot be challenged iii an appeaL ·.. . . . . ·. . 
By contrast with Yucii's aequittal, the High .Court has up-
held some of the other verdicts. · · .· 
The ICFTU resolution 
A strong resolution was adopted at the 105th executive 
meeting of the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Union (ICFTU), following a resolution by the ICFfU-APRO 
Regional Executive Board on 'Solidarity with the SBSI', the 
ICFfU's April-May 1994 complaint to the ILO and its Octo-
ber 1994 report 'Trade Union Repression in Indonesia'. 
The 3 page resolution stresses that: 
the Government of Indonesia, despite promises made earlier 
this year and some limited changes in labour legislation, 
continues to blatantly and systematically violate interna-
tionally-guaranteed trade union and other human rights, 
such as the right to .freedom of association, to organise and 
to bargain collectively and the right to freedom of expres-
sion, to afair trial, to personal security and even to the right 
to life. 
the resolution reaffirms: 
its commitment to provide humanitarian assistance and 
extend maximum moral, political and material support to 
repressed leaders and activists of the SBSI, and its commit-
ment to provide all available assistance in the organising, 
training and legal work of the SBSI and any other legitimate 
trade union activity carried out by this organisation. 
and emphasises: 
its willingness to accept into ICFTU membership by the 
end of J 995 such Indonesian workers' organisation as may 
convincingly establish its bona fide credentials as a genu-
inely free, independent, representative and democratic trade 
union organisation. 
The resolution ends with a call on the Indonesian gov-
ernment to: 
* rescind the unfair verdicts against 'Muchtar Pakpahan 
and all other unjustly detained trade unionists, and order 
their release from prison as a matter of urgency; 
* guarantee and ensure until then that their basic rights as 
detainees are fully respected, including those with respect to 
access to relatives, lawyers and trade union colleagues; 
* speed up the process of revision of the country's labour 
code and practice, with a view to bringing them in line with 
universally-accepted standards and specific !LO recommen-
dations on trade union rights in Indonesia; 
* implement at once the right to .freedom of association by 
granting the long-awaited registration of the SBSJ as a trade 
union. 
The upsurge in strikes 
The Jakarta Labour Office recorded 138 strikes in the 
capital, as compared to 64 strikes in 1993. The Surabaya 
Legal Aid Institute recorded 314 labour disputes in the city in 
1994 as compared to 153 the previous year. Figures from the 
government-sponsored union, the SPSI, are even more spec-
tacular. Chair of the union Imam Sudarwo, said in December 
that there were 1,130 strikes nation-wide in 1994 as com-
pared with 312 strikes in 1993, an increase of 350%. This 
means that there were no fewer than three strikes a day. West 
Java holds the record with 581 strikes, followed by East Java 
with 200, Jakarta with 146, North Sumatra with 140, Central 
Java with 54, Riau with 5, West Kalimantan 3 and one strike 
in South Sumatra. 
The banner reads:" Women Workers of Indonesia, Unite to 
Demand Justice". 
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Indro Sugianto, chair of the LBH (Legal Aid Bureau) in 
Surabaya said that workers' rights continue to be the central 
issue in cases handled by the Institute, the main issue being 
wages. Of a total of 314 strikes, 304 were conflicts concern-
ing wages. Most companies simply ignored the UMR 
(Regional Minimum Wage) fixed by the government. Al-
though minimum rates have risen marginally, they are still 
litHe better than starvation wages and cover only about 60 
to 70% of minimum survival needs. 
According to figures published by Freddy Tuarnelly of the 
Jakarta Labour Department in 1994, 47,265 workers took 
part in 138 strikes and 401,395 working hours were lost be-
cause of labour unrest. About 80% of the cases were demands 
for the minimum rate; the remainder concerned the right to 
set up trade unions, holiday allowances and other working 
conditions. Tuamelly presented a grim picture. Altogether 
3,855 companies were given warnings about violating regu-
lations, in most cases for not paying the minimum wage. 
Unemployment figures are also soaring. Of the 174,692 
people seeking jobs only 13.89% or 24,259 were successful. 
This is far worse than in 1993, and a further deterioration is 
expected this year, when the number seeking work in Jakarta 
is expected to increase to 250,000 people. 
Phantom costs 
One topic constantly in the headlines is the notorious 
biaya siluman or phantom costs, hidden costs which make 
Indonesia a high-cost economy. It is customary for factory 
owners to pay 'dues' to security officers and local government 
officials. At times like Christmas and New Year these costs 
soar to cover the shopping expenses of the officials. No less 
than 30% of production costs is widely thought to go to biaya 
si/uman. The higher these costs, the less there is to pay the 
workers. In a rare moment of frankness, Labour Minister 
Abdul Latief, himself a successful businessman, warned about 
the pr~ctice of paying phantom costs. 
Some examples of recent strikes 
Although there is clearly pressure on the press, reports 
about strikes have become a regular feature because labour 
disputes are now such a common occurrence. Workers have 
become more creative and lively in the methods used. Work-
ers express themselves more freely, using witty posters and 
slogans. Some strikes turn into demonstrations outside the 
local assemblies or the local police headquarters. On some 
occasions the workers have decided to occupy the local La-
bour Office. The process is giving birth to natural workers' 
leaders. 
Ten times in a row 
Workers at PT Gonda Guna Indonesia (GGI) are now so 
angry that it has become a habit to go on strike. Working 
conditions at the factory, a manufacturer of household prod-
ucts, are particularly hazardous. The factory is situated in 
Tangerang, one of the major industrial centres near Jakarta. 
On 10 January this year, the workers went on strike for the 
tenth time, having gone out on strike nine times during 1994. 
About 1,000 workers, supported by a hundred students, de-
manded better safety measures in the factory and social insur-
ance. There have been dozen of accidents and over thirty 
workers have lost fingers, hands or other limbs. 
Health and occupational safety is a low priority for 
most companies. According to official statistics, accidents 
in the workplace totalled a staggering 17, 775 in 1994, 
killing 303 workers and injuring more than 13,000. The 
strikers this time organised a march to the local assembly, the 
DPRD. During the rally, security officers used wooden trun-
cheons to beat up the workers. Several students were arrested. 
Members of a new trade union, the PPB! (see above), helped 
.--------------------------------------------------------------~ toorganisethemarch. 
Hak Berserikat =Right to Organise 
Stabilitas = Stability 
In early December, workers laid 
down tools for the seventh time. The 
demand then was for a lunch allow-
ance of Rp 1,000 (about US$ 0.40) 
and transport money of Rp 500 (US$ 
0.20). This modest demand was 
turned down by the management and 
a strike followed. The striking work-
ers then proposed alternatives and 
were ready to accept a meal instead 
and if the company would agree to 
provide company buses, the problem 
of transportation could be resolved. 
For a whole morning, the workers 
occupied the factory grounds, carry-
ing posters. By afternoon it was clear 
that the management was not going 
to agree so the workers repeated 
their actions on 21 and 28 Decem-
ber. This again proved futile so the 
action was repeated on 10 January, 
this time including demands about 
safety measures. These are supported 
by some local officials. 
GGI is a notorious violator of la-
bour regulations which, set against 
international standards, are very 
inadequate. The head of the Tanger-
ang Labour Department has fre-
quently warned the management 
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about its violations and intends to take the company to 
court. Clearly, the GGJ workers have a case. They have dis-
played determination and consistency in the struggle, which 
are both essential against such an atrocious employer. 
Shoe factory hit by strike 
Also in Tangerang, more than 2,500 workers at PT Sarkis 
Pacific Indonesia (SP!) went on strike on 12 December for 
the right to set up a union. Carrying banners, the workers 
Security officers against striking workers. In labour conflicts the 
military alwa,ys intervene, only increasing tensions. 
refused to go back to work unless their demands were met. 
They complained in particular against the head of personnel 
who has behaved like a dictator, sacking workers at random. 
The wprkers sent a letter to the management signed by 150 
people. The anger escalated when the management refused to 
comply with the demands and instead fired 15 workers with-
out severance pay. A strike became inevitable. 
A delegation of 18 workers discussed their demands with 
the management: to end harassment of workers and start dis-
cussions about several working conditions like lunch allow-
ances, transport money, overtime bonuses and health insur-
ance. Officials from the Labour Department and the SPSI 
were also present. Press reports said nothing about the out-
come of the talks, but negotiations are bound to be tortuous 
and prolonged. 
In the last ten years, shoe manufacturing has become big 
business in Indonesia. Expensive shoes are made by Indone-
sian companies under contract to western companies. The 
shoes are produced by grossly underpaid workers and sold at 
astronomical prices in Europe and the US, bringing huge 
profits for the companies. Competition in the region, particu-
larly with countries like China, has driven the manufacturers 
to boost productivity at the expense of the workers and 
working conditions. 
Minimum wages 
About 1,800 workers, mostly women, at PT Surya Jndah 
Gannindo (SIG) went on strike on 15 December as all efforts 
to consult the management had proved futile. They carried 
posters saying: 'We are not robots ', 'Eradicate the contract-
system ' and 'Pay our wages'. The two major grievances were 
wages and the change from daily to contract-based wages. 
The official minimum wage for Central Java is Rp 2,700 
(US$ 1.30) a day, which is a starvation wage. The highest 
wage paid to workers at SIG is Rp2,500, while some are paid 
less than Rp 2,000 a day. To make matters worse, the man-
agement decided without consultation to switch to contract-
based wages which demands more output in the same period 
of time. After negotiations broke down., the strike turned into 
an emotional event. The workers refused further talks with 
the management and efforts by officials of the Labour De-
partment and SPSI officials to cajole the 
workers into returning to work, were unsuc-
cessful. The workers marched out of the 
factoiy grounds in a veiy orderly fashion. 
· hvo~~~!~~ aCtlvtsts{~ 
• whi~=.:r~~~~~~~! 
•· connection with• the ·mass action Of workers\ Jn Me¢qii Nortli siitnatra in Al>rll t 99'; .. · · · .·. 
· · · P~riin Millill\iiuk; :b>yearst or YK.Ps 
wa~ jailed · !pf eltveJ} Jl\Qrtth~ f9t · • ~jncitiilg 
_...;.. _ _;u......;...;;.i ·ban 38 years got lOnionths · ·The det'end.3rit, · 
••:•ro7~~~~~~~~!~:r::~~~•·•· 
......,..........,.,._,..,.._....,,.....,.' often given legal adwce :to $acked workers or 
·.tho.se in ·.co.nflic,~.~th.~eir: ~n.ii>l.<>~ ··'The•Ju4ge(ound. Maiy~ 
~ak •Johan guilty-Of "11te)teitle,n~ 1¢adin,g tQ · ~ti,o~~ dairiage 
m severidfactofies".iri Medatj: in APrilJ~4~ >> ·•· · · · ··· 
~$~~~r~~e~~ 
..·.· .. · ..... ·.•··Pem•tangSiantar acti~istQ;re~ted . •••· > 
f ~ ~~#;~~~~~s~~i })y t\vO. llle~bers ()f J>O~•ce ~*1{elhgem.:e. They ~est«l ·him at 
•••~~;;~~; .. ~:~11r~··~~~~J~ta:~:;••• day after whiCh a: two.:week attest · an t ·· ·. · sSUed .. • ·•. ' 1c·.· ~al!la1~:~<;nthe.'~:list~:~··~· 1s 
-.P~Y being ~d ~ 3 S\1Sp¢ctfor ~inclnng workets'~·· the ·•· 
~iZa•a~~.···•• •police at around .the same tf . . ·.·. . . . .·. . ·. O . . UJ 
.... · . .. . ...... me •.. > .·.• .. 
···~~?;~~~~~~~~~~;:r::•·: liad ~n red®ed onappeal·to sevenmontbs. TWO Qtli~ whO .• 
; ~re jail~ 8¥rtly~~ Ef.f•di Simb~lon 8nd '.~bdul ·. 
lJdlwan ~1ag1an. wi~I • hav~ t~ s.ervc out ·their one-year sen• 
tenc::es which expJ.Te m JUiy this ye;U. > . . . • < . . · · · 
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Human Rights Day in Indonesia 
Human Rights Day on 10 December, the 46th anniversary of the adoption world-wide of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, was marked by a number of meetings, some of which had to con-
tend with obstructions and harassment from the security forces. An increasing number of groups 
and institutions held celebrations. 
The main celebration in Jakarta was the presentation of 
the 1994 Yap Thiam Hien Human Rights Award to the East 
Java lawyer, Trimoelja D. Soerjadi, for his courageous strug-
gle in defence of basic rights. 
Defendants' rights need protecting 
Trimoelja D. Soerjadi rose to prominence last year for his 
robust defence of the proprietor of a watch-making factory in 
East Java who was charged and found guilty of mastermind-
ing the murder of labour activist, Marsinah in May 1993. 
This trial, as well as those of eight others charged for the 
same offence, was riddled with grave irregularities on the 
part of the arresting authorities, the prosecution and the 
courts. Shortly before the award ceremony, the High Court in 
East Java quashed the 17-year sentence of Trimoelja' s client, 
Yudi Susanto and he was allowed to walk free from prison. 
[See separate item.] 
The award ceremony was organised by YAPUSHAM, the 
Centre for the Study of Human Rights Foundation, which is 
chaired by Todung Mulya Lubis and of which Goenawan 
Mohamad, senior editor of the now-banned weekly, Tempo, is 
the director. 
Cottrf JlUtfia system rife .· .· . 
< .·· N~ty pet" ~ent of Cotlrt case~ ip: Indo11esia . are ~xed in. 
·advance beC3use. of the . cipetatioris of a so-Catted. 'coiift ma- .•• 
fia~,Wj~· i)aym~llts secUriJ1g tJ:tedesired verdict · A recently •·• 
retired mein~r of. the ·· Supreme . Court, Profe5sor . Asikiii, .· has . 
been. ql19ted·. as saying ~t fifty pef eent of cases are fixaj by .. 
the mafia, B'1~ TfuJioelya D. Soerja4i; wh9 AAS worked ··~. a 
·• ~$let fo~ more tfuili: twtmtyyears, · pelieyes that · th~ figur¢ 
, ·· is ·r~:7:meth0d offi~n~ the outc6me oftiihls is<by ~e ··· 
.· officials dire<:tly involved in judicfal proeedures having con-
Sillt8tfons; . ·.· ThcW meet i~ ·. ~· institution knoMi as Mahkeja- . 
pol, a ooard. in each. regi()n which is . composed of the head of 
.the district ~urt. the attorn.ey and the chief of police~ . Accord-
ing to Triinoolya, th~ Mahkejapol always . meets to diseuss the 
·.more important trials. "But.what about .the .independence of 
thejudge? If they bave had meetings in advcmce, the <Ustrict . 
court ¢hairman will . then pass down ... inSmJctions to the 
judges llandling the case. Isn't that . impossible? If a judge 
·. passes a verdict that goes aW,rlnst what his .~haif1Jl3n told him . 
to · do, ·he• s · not likely to be· given any more trials to judge." 
[Iriterview in Forum Keadilan, 5.1.1995] · · 
In his acceptance speech, Trimoelja called for an overhaul 
of the Criminal Procedural Code because it fails to protect 
the basic rights of defendants and contains no provisions for 
officials who have been found guilty of unlawful arrest to be 
investigated and disciplined or punished. In the case of his 
client, Yudi Susanto, the district court ruled before his trial 
began that he had been detained unlawfully yet no officials 
were charged for having violated the procedures. Trimoelja 
also spoke about many unlawful practices to which his client 
was subjected while in army custody for the first 19 days of 
his detention in October 1993. [Jakarta Post, 12.XII.1994) 
Last year, the Award which is named after one of Indo-
nesia's foremost human rights lawyers, was granted posthu-
mously to the labour activist, Marsinah. The true facts about 
her death at the hands of the military have still to be revealed. 
[see special item]. 
Clashes with police in Bandung 
Human Rights Day celebrations were held at several uni-
versities in the West Java capital of Bandung. The issues 
raise at all the events were the many abuses perpetrated in 
Indonesia during the past year, particularly the closure of 
three weeklies, Tempo, Editor and DeTik, in June, the many 
labour disputes stemming from the denial of the workers' 
right of association and abuses that have occurred in East 
Timor. 
When students celebrating the occasion at the Bandung 
Islamic University left the campus to march through the 
streets of the city, they were confronted by security forces 
with anti-riot gear. As students tried to force their way out, 
scuffles broke out and they were clubbed with rattan batons. 
A number of people were hit, including two journalists who 
were mistaken for students by the security forces. 
During the campus meeting, the gathering responded an-
grily to an announcement that Baharuddin Lopa, secretary of 
the National Commission for Human Rights, failed to re-
spond to an invitation to speak at the rally. 
The other Human Rights Day celebrations were held at 
the city's Pasundan University and the State Institute for Is-
lamic Studies (IAIN). [Jakarta Post, 12.XII.1994) 
Jakarta gathering harassed 
Another meeting in Jakarta convened by the Society for 
Human Rights Information and Advocacy (Pernia) was not 
actually dispersed by the police but suffered a series of delib-
erate obstructions. Pernia is a new human rights organisation 
set up in Jakarta by long-time activists. 
The first was when the police tried unsuccessfully to exert 
pressure on the owners of the building where it was held to 
can~el their booking. Some months ago, the police disperse a 
semmar held at the same venue on land rights that was or-
ganised by the Legal Aid Foundation, YLBHI. 
People arriving to attend the Human Rights Day celebra-
tion were confronted by police who tried to tum them away, 
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alleging that the event had been cancelled. Later, while 
the meeting was in progress, there was a short circuit that 
turned off the loud-speaker system and the air-conditioning. 
There was no trouble with the electricity supply in an adjoin-
ing room which convinced those present that the switch-off 
was deliberate. 
Princen on extra-judicial killings 
The highly-respected human rights activist, Haji J.C. 
Princen used the occasion to draw attention to the shoot-to-
kill policy of the security forces in Jakarta He told the Jakarta 
meeting that the police had shot dead 134 people in the 
streets of the capital in the period from January 1992 to Feb-
ruary 1994. The people thus treated were not even proven 
criminals. "The 'presumption of innocence' principle is sa-
cred and must be upheld in any state claiming to be based on 
the rule of law," he said. Some victims had been shot after 
they had been hand-cuffed while others were shot at close 
range. 
He said it was about time the government enacted a clear 
provision against violence and for anyone working for the 
security forces to be suspended from duty while being investi-
gated for acts of violence. 
Princen read out the names of many of the victims of the 
shoot-to-kill policy. [Merdeka, 12.XII.1994] 
Campus newspaper banned 
Warta UJ, the campus publication of the University of In-
donesia, one of the country's leading state universities, has 
been banned by the rectorate for publishing the results of a 
poll on the decision to raise tuition fees. The hike in fees was 
at the centre of campus events to mark Human Rights Day. 
A well-attended rally held on Human Rights Day criti-
cised the university authorities for obstructing free discussion 
on campus about the country's political system and prevent-
ing prominent outside speakers like human ri_ghts lawyer Ad-
nan Buyung Nasution from addressing meetmgs on c~mp1;15. 
The rally which included poetry recitations focused pnmarily 
on the almost twofold increase in tuition fees. The current fee 
of Rp. 400,000 per semester may not be prohibitive for mid-
dle class families but it is way beyond the capacity of students 
from worker or peasant families., speakers told the rally. 
After marching along the streets of Depok, south of Ja-
karta, where the university is located, some university lectur-
ers, backed by the university security forces, used violence to 
prevent the students from re-entering the campus. Students 
responded with yells of "Fascists!" and "Repressors!". 
[Jakarta Post, 14.XII.1994] 
. Di;.I A ;ardf l)I'(ottrjaUi!d activists 
•••... . . Four Jaiied activists, convicted bn a y~etY {)f charges; have 
been: given a newty,,estabfi~hed ~war<l; . the J?igul Award. . . ~e ft)~ 
O~: Yeni Rosa Oariiayanti; convicted for ~inliulting the pi:es1derit', ·• 
·Muchtar .· Pakpahan, j ailed fQr 0rgarusing w9r:trers, Bambang. 
Beath or SUryadi, jailed ov~ the q~tioQ offree<lOm of expreSSi(>rt, 
and Dedi Ekadibrata; a student of Jaw~ · conVicted for helping ·peo.-·· 
<pie . mvbl~d in, land .disputes. Tliey have~· nqnoure~ffor . th¢it 
~~catiorifobmnanitarian prfuCiples; [Merdeka, J4XII.J 994} ·· 
i,~~i~;~t°bhfc~ ~~~ff~if~~~ ~flee~~~fs ~~·••• 
MIDKA, Iridotje$iW. S()ciety f9J: ~()Cljlcy and. People. The \vul~ 
.nei:s oft:heAwaro w~ riam¢d on Human!Ughti;' .Day and were to •·. 
receive their awafds .in jail (81iliougb x eru has siflee beenrelea$ed) .•••. 
'MO)KA $poke~rs0il Agus EdfSantoSQ $1tjd the deci.Sion was taken ·· 
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Suharto, the free-trade wizard 
During the APEC Conference all the signs were that Suharto had joined the camp of free-trade ad-
vocates. 'Free trade is a must' said the president, much to the surprise of Indonesian analysts who 
know just how m.uch state protection there is for companies owned by palace cronies or by the Su-
harto dynasty. But thefree-trade rhetoric lasted only a few weeks, collapsing at the first hurdle. 
Hosting the APEC Conference, Suharto crafted a declara-
tion which surprised even the staunchest free-trade champi-
ons like Singapore and Japan. It called for the elimination of 
all trade barriers and the creation of the biggest free-trade 
area in the world by 2020. On several occasions Suharto reit-
erated his conversion to the free-traae cause: on 19 December 
he said: "We have to realise, whether we are ready or not, the 
world is moving fast towards a free trade system,, and con-
cluded "We cannot afford to be left behind" [Jakarta Post, 
20 December 1994]. 
Suharto's championing of free trade has created a deep 
rift among the top bureaucrats in the country. Many westem-
trained technocrats have welcomed the free-trade credo of the 
president, arguing that free trade will create better competi-
tiveness for manufacturing industry and greater openings to 
the global market. But the more nationalist-oriented econo-
mists are dumbfounded and argue that this would be a sell-
out, a betrayal of national interests and the young manufac-
turing industry which could eventually be gobbled up by more 
powerful foreign competitors. 
The reality in the Indonesian economy is of course some-
~here .in between. Although Indonesian economic state poli-
cies fatthfully toe IMF/World Bank guidelines, which propa-
gate free trade, it is still an economy ridden with all kinds of 
tariffs, barriers and hidden costs. 
The Chandra Asri case 
In December Suharto's free-trade advocacy was put to the 
test by the Chandra Asri case. Chandra Asri Petrochemical 
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Centre (CAPC) is not just any old company; it is partly 
owned by Bambang Suharto, the President's second son, and 
Prayogo Pangestu, Suharto's current favourite crony. CAPC 
is the supreme example of a company born, bred, groomed 
and protected by the state. Prayogo received an interest-free 
loan of US$218 million from two state-owned banks in order 
to participate in the project, together with Bimantara, Bam-
bang Suharto's company, Sudwikatmono, Suharto's cousin, 
Henry Pribadi, another crony and the Japanese plastics giant, 
Marubeni. In 1991, the Indonesian government was forced to 
shelve all mega-projects for budgetary reasons. CAPC, cost-
ing a total of US$ 1.6 billion and almost entirely financed by 
external loans, was one of the giants was brought to a halt. 
A few months later, CAPC, helped along by some neat 
footwork, was allowed to go ahead, by simply declaring the 
project to be a 100% foreign investment, despite the fact that 
the majority of the shares were in the hands of the same peo-
ple, only now using holding companies based in Hongkong . 
This clearly was and is Suharto's pet project and the pros-
pects of monopolising a domestic market of almost 200 mil-
lion people are bright indeed. 
The well-connected company is designed to produce ole-
fins like ethylene and propylene, the basic ingredients for 
household plastic products, film, synthetic fibres and yams. 
In the first months of 1995 CAPC is expected to start produc-
ing up to 522,000 tonnes of ethylene annually, along with 
243,000 tonnes of propylene and 300,000 tonnes of polypro-
pylene. 
Ministers at loggerheads 
Then in December, Peter Gontha, a senior CAPC execu-
tive, submitted a request to the government for tariffs of be· 
tween 35 and 40% on olefin import products. Gontha argued 
that neighbouring countries like Japan, Malaysia and Thai-
land do exactly the same to protect their petrochemical indus-
tries. CAPC will save Indonesia annually US$ l billion in 
foreign exchange and could create 800,000 jobs. The request 
was the catalyst for a simmering conflict between technocrats 
and nationalists. 
ECONOMICS 
Finance Minister Mar'ie Muhammad, an austere bureau-
crat and belonging to neither camp, spoke against the tariffs. 
Mar' ie Muhammad who has shown his muscle on earlier 
occasions, has gradually built a reputation of being against 
favouritism for big corporations, an odd-ball in Suharto's 
cabinet. Last year he won one big battle against the power-
house and colleague minister Habibie when he refused to pay 
the huge sum of US $1.1 billion for the purchase of 39 refur-
bished former East German naval vessels. Habibie was forced 
to accept a third of that amount. 
Others joined Mar' ie Muhammad and spoke against pro-
tectionism, not least Prof. Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo, the 
eminence grise of Indonesian economists and an in-law of the 
president. (Soemitro' s son Prabowo married to Suharto's 
daughter Titi). Soemitro argues that this kind of protection-
ism only creates a high-cost, inefficient economy, creating 
unnecessarily costly products in the downstream manufactur-
ing industries. Others like Ginandjar Kartasasmita, head of 
the State Planning Bureau and Hartarto, the Co-ordinating 
Minister for Industry and Trade take an in-between position, 
rejecting tariffs higher than 5%. 
The other camp, notably Minister of Industry Tungky 
Ariwibowo and Minister for Investments Sanyoto Sastrowar-
doyo, firmly back tariffs. Both received support from many 
domestic business groups. 
The procedure is for a decision to be taken by an interde-
partemental working group, the special tariff team, composed 
of officials from the finance, trade and industry ministries. 
Initially chaired by Finance Minister Mar'ie Muhammad, 
Suharto stepped in, replaced Mar'ie Muhammad by Hartarto 
and brought Sanyoto in. The decision to be taken was by then 
obvious. 
Protectionism prevails 
At the end of 1994, Minister of Investments Sanyoto had 
a long session with Suharto and announced afterwards that 
Suharto told to him that giving protection to upstream indus-
tries should be seen against the long-term prospects of the 
Indonesian economy. A week later, Suharto delivered his 
annual budget speech and went to some lengths to exi>lain the 
justifications for protection. Provided certain conditions are 
met, tariff protection can be given to upstream industries. A 
few months earlier, that same Suharto had designed a deregu-
lation package ruling out tariff escalation for the products of 
new industries. Suharto also said that protection is justifiable 
for a limited period only and must be gradually reduced, 
which is what CAPC was requesting. Though Chandra Asri 
was not mentioned, everybody knew that he had spoken the 
last word on the matter. Suharto's free-trade credo lasted less 
than two months. Nepotism is the name of the game. 
• 
Continued from page 13 
his normal human rights activities. The hurricane he un-
leashed in Holland has turned the reckoning with the dark 
1945-50 period into a much more public issue. Minister for 
Development Aid Jan Pronk recently spoke openly of recog-
nising 17 August 45 as Indonesia's National Independence 
Day. It is now up to the Dutch government to re-write history. 
After half a century, change in Holland is long overdue. 
Poncke Princen unwittingly contributed to this process. 
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The Rudy Habibie empire 
Rudy Habibie is arguably Indonesia's most influential citizen, after President Suharto, of course. 
Although officially he only holds the humble position of Minister of Research and Technology in 
the. cabinet, he is far more powerful than that. As Suharto's foster-son, Habibie's power seemingly 
knows no bounds. 
Having Suharto's confidence and friendship is the key to 
Habibie' s success, the gateway for the creation of an eco-
nomic and political empire. At first, he was known simply as 
the high-tech czar-of Indonesia, in charge of all its vital in-
dustries; since 1990 he has emerged as a political power-
house, chairing ICM!, the Muslim Intellectuals' Union, as 
well as playing a vital role in GOLKAR, the ruling party. No 
wonder many of his supporters see Rudy Habibie as the next 
president of the Indonesian Republic. 
The Suharto-Habibie liaison 
The Suharto relationship with the Habibie family goes 
back to the early fifties when the young lieutenant colonel 
was sent to Sulawesi to crush a local rebellion. In his autobi-
ography, Suharto speaks fondly about the Habibie family who 
lived near the garri-
son. Mrs. Tuti Marini 
Habibie, Rudy's 
mother was a native 
from Yogya and 
cooked delicious 
Javanese meals, the 
kind of food Suharto 
cannot live without. 
Bacharuddin Jusuf 
(Rudy) Habibie, born 
in Pare-Pare (South 
Sulawesi) on 25 June 
1936, was a teenager 
at the time but those 
first contacts proved 
to be the start of a 
long relationship. 
Rudy Habibie gradu-
ated in engineering 
in Bandung and ob-
tained his PhD in 
aero-engineering in 
Aachen, Germany. In 
1974, Rudy Habibie, 
already in a senior 
position at the Ger-
man aircraft com-
pany MBB, was 
summoned home by 
Suharto. 
1974 was a hectic year for Indonesia. Huge demonstra-
tions, the so-called Malari events, rocked the capital and 
threatened Suharto's rule. The regime was quite shaky and it 
took all the skills at Suharto's command to consolidate his 
rule. The Indonesian economy, primarily based on oil reve-
nues, was in need of a new thrust. Habibie was the man cho-
sen for the job. After a day discussing grand schemes to in-
dustrialise Indonesia, Suharto and Habibie agreed on a plan. 
·From then on, Habibie had a free hand and unlimited funds 
were put at his disposal. The story goes that Suharto told the 
ambitious young engineer: "Habibie, you can do whatever 
you want short of fomenting a revolutiqn ". In Suharto's 
autobiography Habibie occupies a prominent place; Suharto 
explains at length why he shares Habibie' s views and sup-
ports his methods. 
Ha bibienomics 
For the first fifteen years of the New Order, economic 
policies were primarily designed by the technocrats, western 
trained economists nicknamed the 'Berkeley Mafia'. The 
thrust of this World Bank/IMF style economy is what is 
commonly called comparative advantage i.e. using a coun-
try's natural resources and cheap labour to the best advantage 
for its role in the world mar-
ket. The Indonesian economy 
has been groomed along these 
lines: exploitation of natural 
resources and an export-
oriented industry with semi-
slavery conditions for the 
labour force. 
Habibie rejects this ap-
proach and argues that his 
economic policies will pave 
the way for industrialisation. 
He is scathing in his criticism 
of the fast-growing domestic 
manufacturing industry pro-
ducing shoes and blue jeans 
for the world market. His 
views, nowadays called 
Habibienomics, can be de-
scribed in a nutshell as, not 
the comparative advantage 
but the competitive advantage 
approach. Comparative ad-
vantage can provide rapid 
economic growth in the short 
term but will ultimately col-
lapse as industries are relo-
cated to other regions with 
even lower labour costs. The 
competitive advantage is 
. . based on technology which 
wdl give an added value to domestic production. 
The high t~hnology industries, Habibie argues, will not 
create growth m the short term, but will produce a beneficial 
spin-off ri.g~t across i~dustry i~ the longer term. Engineers 
and technicians sufficiently tramed in their specialised areas 
will sprea~ their skills and knowledge across the board. He 
fi!ffily beheve.s that the state should pioneer this process, 
given that pnvate firms cannot provide the necessary re-
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sources for research and development. Habibie often 
speaks highly of the success stories of Taiwan and South Ko-
rea, who used the state machinery to boost industrialisation. 
The high-tech czar 
So far President Suharto, although decidedly in favour of 
Habibienomics, has had to keep a balance between the two 
approaches. The World Bank/IMF approach promoted rapid 
economic growth in the second half of the eighties, helping to 
foster business tycoons, including Suharto's sons and daugh-
ters. The path taken by Habibie has predictably been thorny. 
He set up two important centres: BPIS and BPPT. BPIS, the 
Coordinating Agency for Strategic Industries, is the flagship 
of the entire strategic sector which includes ten state compa-
nies in all, among them: IPTN, the aircraft industry, 
Krakatau Steel, PT PAL, the shipbuilding industry and PT 
PINDAD, the weapon and ammunition factory. BPPT is the 
country's technological think-tank, providing jobs for hun-
dreds of highly-trained engineers and technicians. 
Besides being Minister of Research and Technology, he 
holds at least a dozen other prestigious positions, making him 
an Indonesian superman. Next to chairing all these agencies, 
he is the managing director of the strategic companies IPTN, 
PT PAL, PT PINDAD and chairs the Development Agency 
for Batam, the boom island close to Singapore. 
High cost economy 
The Habibie way of running high-tech companies has 
been controversial from the start. The companies absorb huge 
amounts of state funds and are likely to continue to do so for 
the foreseeable future. The lack of transparency about the 
finances of the companies has been a nightmare for ministers 
and bureaucrats in charge of financing. IPTN, the aircraft 
company, in particular has caused huge problems. 
IPTN, located in Bandung, West Java, employs at least 
15,000 highly trained people and is projected to grow to 
60,000 by the tum of the century. It started as an air-force 
repair facility but now produces small aircraft, helicopters 
under license, aircraft components and weapon systems. Ini-
tially, Habibie undertook production in cooperation with for-
eign aircraft companies like Bell in the US, CASA of Spain 
and MBB of Germany but in 1989 he decided to develop his 
own aircraft, the N-250. The 70-seater is an ambitious project 
with highly sophisticated technology such as glass-cockpit 
avionics and a special flight-control system, for which IPTN 
has relied on foreign suppliers. 
After major technological and financial problems, the N-
250 was officially launched during APEC, the Asia-Pacific 
Economic conference, in the presence of an array of world 
leaders. Although IPTN talks optimistically about selling 700 
N-250s, there are no signs this will be achieved. Despite a 
host of financial disasters, Habibie remains confident and is 
looking ahead to another project, a 130-seat fly-by-wire, tran-
sonic speed twin-jet. 
At least US $1.6 billion state money has been sunk into 
IPTN, but the company has yet to become internationally 
competitive or genuinely profitable, argue economic analysts. 
In particular, the prestige-project N-250 has been at the cen-
tre of controversy. In 1993 Habibie became embrpiled in a 
battle over state funding for the N-250. The new Minister of 
Finance Mar'ie Muhammad reportedly refused to channel 
more money into the project and IPTN was forced to dig into 
its own capital reserves. President Suharto came to the res-
cue, instructing the Forestry Minister to release USS 185 
million from the reforestation funds to keep the project afloat. 
Several environmental groups tried unsuccessfully to prevent 
this. [See also Tapol Bulletin No. 125, October 1994]. 
IPROFlLE 
. . •.. H~l)ibie's s~ecial s~atus 
..... . Pt PAL •• ·.. the ~tiipbuildiug 'firm, ·. illu$'ates vividly 
Habibje 's speciat sta~f ... · • · . . . .. · 
····· : ..... The tax audit discovered that PT PAL had under-
.• r:epor.ted if!cO..rn~for afhree~earperiod., }985 to ./f/87 .. ln a 
· Jetter . dated f(J Odoher · 1990, • th~n Finance Minister Sumar-
lin informed Habibie that Pt;J>AL was liable for past tax 
.payments plus fines, ·which together .amoWJfed to about US$ 
:*P million~ . On. 2 5 March l 991; . Habibie }Vroie .b.ack refuting 
tne·a~dit a"'4.sayiiig that paym.~nt of pasit~e.s. 'wouid be a . 
burden for P.T PA.Land daniag'e >itifuturep~osjJepts'; He sent 
(i copy <>/the: letter ii> Soeharto, ·. two days/at er. · State Secre-
tqry.MurdloiJq PO§Sed orz 11 terse; very unjlav.anese. m¢s8qge 
from SOehatto 10 su~qr.lin: .'If th..e. Minister~JF'lnaii:(eltds a 
:p~obleni ~;th waiVing PT PAL 's .. tax payments, ihen the 
f.re.sident wlll do it. PT PAL is a state-owned company, not a 
. private Habibie ~nterprise, . pnd . it doesT; 't need .. ·. to . be · 
squeezed of tai.' The. srib/ecf ~as . dropped· (A . Naiton · in 
.Waiting,~~ SChwatz,Allen~ Unwi~ ~~94~ pg 72]. 
As is often the case, promoting high-tech goes hand in 
hand with the promotion of technology for military purposes. 
The majority of Habibie's strategic companies are part of 
Indonesia's growing military industrial complex. While in 
the early period, top-ranking generals benefited from 
Habibie's industrial empire, in the past decade, sharp differ-
ences have arisen. Officers used to running their own affairs 
and buying their own hardware have been side-stepped by 
Habibie. The bottom line is money; everybody knows that the 
purchase of weapons provides plenty of kickbacks which now 
fill the pockets of the Habibie clique. Moreover, the generals 
resent being forced to purchase helicopters, ships and aircraft 
from Habibie's companies when better vehicles are on offer 
on the world market. 
It was the purchase of 3 9 naval vessels from the former 
East German navy that brought into the open the conflict 
between Habibie and the generals and technocrats. As 
Habibie's power has increased, he has gained more enemies. 
Now that he has built a political power base, the number of 
enemies has multiplied. 
ICMI, Habibie's political vehicle 
In December 1990 Habibie set up ICM!, the Association 
of Muslim Intellectuals, and became its chair. Only a nominal 
Muslim, Habibie was initially hesitant about taking it on but 
pressure from several influential Muslim intellectuals, and 
particularly from Suharto persuaded Habibie. Given the 
stalemate in politics, ICM! quickly became a powerhouse, a 
rallying point for at least three trends in political Islam: the 
natural Habibie allies, technologists and bureaucrats working 
within the Habibie empire; Muslim intellectuals, often called 
Muslim modernists, who have been searching for decades for 
a political umbrella and see his cosy relationship with the 
president as providing unprecedented opportunities. The rest 
joined ICM! for a variety of reasons: dissatisfaction with the 
obscure role of political Islam in Indonesia or the economic 
strength of the Indonesian Chinese or the over-representation 
of Christians within the Indonesian hierarchy. 
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While Habibie relies primarily on the first and third 
groups, it is the Muslim intellectuals who have a clear agenda 
for ICM/. A small group of Muslim intellectuals first had the 
idea of setting up ICMI and Suharto embraced it as it suited 
his need to broaden his political base, using it as a buffer 
against the military. Suharto rewarded ICM/ quite generously 
with several posts in the cabinet and a number seats in par-
liament representing the ruling party, GOLKAR. ICM/ peo-
ple catapulted into high positions, all of them from the first 
group, the Habibie loyalists. The second group, often called 
'the real ICM/', by no means unified in their views, have 
built an influential think-tank called CIDES (Centre for In-
formation and Development Studies) and a well-run newspa-
per, Repub/ika. 
To put it bluntly, tired of fighting the system, they opted 
to join it, in other words, translating clientelism through 
Habibie into more political power, as has already happened. 
In the political game of who is using who, thirty years' rule 
has made Suharto a past-master. It has become clear that Su-
harto distrusts 'the real ICM/' and will never allow them to 
become too powerful. 
Suharto and Habibie share the same concepts 
Ha bibie the politician 
The Suharto-Habibie duo performed quite a political 
tango when they stage-managed two major events in 1993: 
the MPR (Congress) session in March that re-elected Suharto 
and the GOLKAR congress in October. On both occasions 
Habibie a.cted as the manipulator (with Suharto behind the 
scenes), curtailing the influence of the military and the tech-
nocrats and promoting ICMI bureaucrats and Suharto loyal-
ists. For the first time the GOLKAR chairmanship was occu-
pied by a civilian, Harmoko, the Minister of Information and 
known as the "censorship boss". 
On many occasions, Habibie has boasted that he learned 
his ABC as a politician from his guru Suharto. The GOLKAR 
congress was typical of Suharto's craftsmanship with 
Habibie executing the plot. The outgoing board under ret'd 
general Wahono was humiliated over its successor board -
Habibie was ready with his own list of candidates. The new 
board was nepotism and political clientelism at its crudest. 
Tutut Suharto became vice-chair while Bambang Suharto 
emerged as treasurer. Habibie installed eleven of his cohorts 
on the board, proving that JCMI has become the stepping-
stone to higher realms. 
Greed and nepotism 
As a civilian, Habibie is the only non-military person in 
30 years of Suharto's rule ever to have gained so much 
power. A remarkable achievement but, as analysts say, 
Habibie could only have come this far thanks to his special 
relationship with Suharto. In the past Suharto used different 
allies, General Ali Murtopo, General Benny Murdani or Gen-
eral Sudharmono. But their relationship with Suharto was 
fundamentally different. Suharto profoundly distrusts any-
body who gets too powerful. At the peak of their careers, 
these generals were stripped of their powers. 
His tie with Habibie is a different ball-game. Suharto has 
complete trust in him and apparently does not see him as a 
patential threat. Their personalities differ markedly. Suharto 
is a bl~d, uninspiring man while Habibie has a dazzling 
style, with a reputation of engaging in hours' -long mono-
logues extolling his technology dreams. But the two have a 
lot in common, not least their greed and favouritism for close 
re,atives. 
Political analysts in Jakarta say that Rudy Habibie's 
nepotism is unending. The Habibie family has become quite a 
dynasty with at least 40 companies involving brothers, sisters, 
children and in-laws. Rudy Habibie's private residence in the 
elite Jakarta suburb of Kebayoran Barn is an example of the 
burgeoning wealth of the Habibie dynasty. Starting with just a 
villa, the Habibie residence has spread to include all the 
houses in the block, an entire complex of affluence. Similarly, 
Suharto's residence in Jalan Cendana clawed up the entire 
block. 
The majority of Habibie companies are known as the 
TIMSCO Group, named after Timmy, the nickname of 
Suyatim Abdulrachman Habibie, the youngest of Habibie' s 
brothers. The TIMSCO Group consist of at least a hundred 
companies, including affiliates, many of which were set up to 
carry out special tasks, while thirty to forty have longer-term 
tasks. Many are joint ventures with the Suharto crony Liem 
Sioe Liong or with members of the Suharto clan, notably sons 
Bambang and Tommy, daughter Tutut Suharto and cousin 
Sudwikatmono. 
The holding company is PT TIMSCO Indonesia whose 
activi~es . range . fro~ trading, consultancies, plantations, 
chemical 1~d~es, p1~ and poultry farming to construction, 
tele-co~urucattons, aenal mapping and tourism. According 
to offiCial figures for 1993, PT TIMSCO had a turnover ofRp 
~30 billion (US~ ~00 million) and assets worth Rp 290 bil-
~on ~S$150 milhon). A list of the Habibie family companies 
1s available on request from the T APOL office. 
Sources: 
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Apnl 1993 & No. 120December1993. ' · 
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len & Unwm 1994. · 
Suedostasien Informationen, No. 3/IX, September 1993 
Forum Keadilan, No. 20/Il, 20 Jan. 1994. · 
Man of the People, Paul Lewis Flight International 23 29 N 1994. , - ov. 
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Prospects for the opposition 
Indro Sukmadji Tjahjono, a human rights activist who visited London in November as part of the 
Stop Arming Indonesia campaign, spoke to TAPOL in an interview about the prospects and prob-
lems of developing an effective opposition in Indonesia 
How did you become an activist? 
My family is from Madiun, East Java and my father was a 
government official. After spending my childhood years in 
Irian Jaya, I went to school in Jakarta. Already at secondary 
school I had articles published in the national press, mostly 
about economics and the problems of the weaker elements in 
the economy, the small businesspeople and traders. 
At the Bandung Institute of Technology, I got involved in 
student activities, editing campus magazines. I was on the 
Maje/is Pemusyawaratan Mahasiswa (Student Consultative 
Council), in charge of the education commission. 
In 1977, after a protest against the ITB Student Council 
(DM), I was forced to resign and I became chair of the new 
DM. We invited DMs from all over the country to a meeting 
in Bandung at which we adopted the Jkrar Mahasiswa Indo-
nesia, the Indonesian Students' Proclamation, on 28 October 
1977, calling for the proper implementation of the 1945 
Constitution, a special session of the MPR - the supreme leg-
islative assembly - to call President Suharto to account for his 
many irregularities in economic affairs and in constitutional 
matters, and for students to forge unity around these demands 
With others I then set up the Indonesian Research Asso-
ciation to study the critical social sciences theories that have 
no place in Indonesian universities. We did research and held 
seminars. We wanted research to be conducted with a clear 
sense of commitment to the common people, the. praxis the-
ory of investigation. We used the theories of Habennas 
Gramsci and Marx and created a Forum of Transformatio~ 
Social Sciences, to use the social sciences to transform soci-
ety. We studied many books that Indonesians were afraid of 
reading or would only discuss in secret. We started doing this 
out in the open. 
But there was a split between those who wanted to stick to 
an intellectual role and those who felt that science alone was 
not enough. It was not enough to be committed in theory; we 
also had to be engaged in the problems of society. I was with 
the latter. This was why I decided to join SKEPHI, the For-
estry Conservation Network, a body for applying ideas in 
practice. 
In environmental affairs, there are different approaches. 
Some are concerned with conservation along capitalist lines, 
But SKEPHI was the only environmental organisation look-
and organise actions on campus. This was after the m=-=--====== ==== ========== = :--. 
1977 elections when there were numerous irregularities 
and harassment of political leaders. 
All campuses occupied by army 
After a second meeting of the DMs, with represen-
tatives coming from universities in Java and the other 
islands, the on-campus activities spread. Then the 
army occupied all campuses for more than six months 1 
and lectures were suspended because of the occupa-
tions, resulting in a one-year suspension of studies. 
In 1978, all the DMs were dissolved and replaced 
by organisations strictly controlled by the university 
authorities. There were many conflicts between stu-
dents and the authorities and all activities of a political 
nature on campus were banned, meaning that students 
had to conduct activities outside the campuses. 
In the clampdown, six hundred student activists 
were arrested. of whom about half were held for some 
time. Thirty-five were tried under the 'hate-spreading' 
articles of the Criminal Code. I went into hiding. After 
things had calmed down, I turned myself in to the police. I 
was sentenced to eleven months. We were treated more leni-
ently in those days than the two Bambangs and Bonar Tigor 
Naipospos in the 1980s; they got eight years each as well as 
being expelled from college. We weren't expelled and were 
able to complete our studies. 
After graduating, I set up the 28 October Foundation to 
deal with political and social affairs and help those victimised 
in the clampdown, but this didn't get very far. Many of the 
activists were frustrated and stopped being active. 
Indro Sukmadji Tjahjono (right) demonstrating outside the 
British Aerospace Extraordinary General Meeting in London. 
ing at issues in a more critical way. Our position is that it is 
not enough to issue statements; we must also get involved in 
actions. This also involves basic human rights so we set up 
INFIGHT, the Indonesian Front for the Defence of Human 
Rights, giving us a broader scope for political activities. 
What is the position of SKEPHI now? 
Two years after I joined, we announced that it was no 
longe.r an NGO but a Pe_ople Network. We would no longer 
function as an NGO but immerse ourselves in peoples' strug-
gles. In those days, NGOs could not be relied on for this be-
cause they stuck to the principle of development and did not 
side with the people. 
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We encountered problems when we started to organise 
training sessions for NGOs in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulaw-
esi, Irian Jaya and West Java and tried to socialise the NGOs 
to side with the people. But it didn't work because the local 
NGOs were tied to the idea of development. 
Involvement in land disputes 
Then we began to get involved in land struggles. Wher-
ever there is a conflict, a dispute between people and state 
institutions, we will get involved. 
It is not for us to create conflicts. The conflicts must al-
ready exist but we see our role as being to elaborate on the 
issues involved. While other NGOs may not agree with stu-
dents getting involved, our organisation sees it as our re-
sponsibility to go out and give support. So you should not see 
SKEPID as an NGO. We do what we can to help actions. 
This means organising students who have adopted a criti-
cal approach, many of whom have had to quit their studies 
because of this. As a result, by a dialectical process, cadres 
emerge. We have had a fair amount of success. Students who 
have helped facilitate disputes learn to become more critical. 
This is the way to go, rather than propagating leftist or 
other theories. Our approach is not to teach this or that theory 
but get people involved in disputes so it's then a matter for 
them to choose. It also helps to foster courage. 
It has taken me a long time to reach this position, since 
1977. It has been a lengthy path for me, with many disagree-
ments and conflicts, losing friends and facing splits with PSI 
(the Socialist Party) people who don't want to get involved in 
actions. 
But I think we can pride ourselves on having achieved a 
degree of consistency, presenting students with the choice of 
becoming intellectuals or people engaged in the struggle. 
The results have been considerable with many students 
getting the courage to take risks that could be fatal. As you 
can see, we have survived and this emboldens others to get 
involved. 
We've moved on as well, taking up the issue of East 
Timor. The students mix with East Timorese, lots of whom 
come to our office. 
Since when have you at SKEPHI been involved with 
East Timor? 
It goes back to before the Dili massacre and before IN-
FIGHT was set up; we were in contact with West Papuans in 
the OPM, and with East Timorese. Then INFIGHT came 
along. In those days we worked closely with Princen and his 
human rights organisation, LPHAM. 
A culture of resistance 
These days, a number of organisations have emerged with 
a critical approach. In the old days, people were afraid to take 
a confrontative position towards the government but now 
people have lost their fear. A culture of resistance has devel-
oped, which is very important. It's not possible to help the 
exploited people without becoming involved in acts of resis-
tance. It's as straightforward as that. 
Various leftward-leaning groups of many kinds are now 
emerging all over the place. What we need now is unity. 
Bow would you assess the opposition movement in In-
donesia today? 
There's a lot of opposition today and that's very positive, 
to oppose the exploitative regime and oppose state h~gemony. 
But the problem is that these disparate forces are difficult to 
unify. There is no leadership nor is there yet any form of or-
ganisation although the culture of resistance is now w~ll es-
tablished. We need to avoid conflicts among people m the 
opposition so as not to damage the movement that now exists. 
If contradictions emerge, we need to talk them through, ex-
change ideas, 
When we talk of leadership, it's not something that can be 
created but rather something that emerges. During the course 
of confrontation the leadership will be sure to emerge. This 
should happen by a natural process. It's part of the di~ectical 
process of our resistance. One thing to beware of is when 
during an action, students push themself forward as a leader. 
We have to take account of the balance between the op-
position and those who hold state hegemony. It is very unbal-
anced, not because of the social forces backing each side but 
because one side is armed and the other is not. 
Using armed power is an integral part of state hegemony. 
The theory of resistance against an armed force is to wage 
armed struggle but this would have appalling consequences 
for us. It would be impossible in Indonesia. 
So how do you cope with this problem? 
We need to develop a form of non-violent opposition and 
we are conducting training in this direction. 
Last June when the three magazines were banned, a 
big protest movement developed but it was confrontec by 
armed troops. Did this kiJI the protest? 
No, it's not dead. We are working towards a recovery, a 
way of overcoming the problem. Dialectically speaking, all 
the ingredients are there, the front, the cadres, the students. 
But those on the other side have arms concentrated in their 
hands. Our concept is non-violence, a principle that requires 
a mass movement. With a mass force, we can smash the the-
sis of armed power which is that arms serve a useful purpose 
because people are afraid of being killed. That is their prem-
ise. If we can gather a large enough force, they will not be 
able to use their weapons. We can learn a lot from the Phil-
ippines. They had the courage to lie down in front of the 
tanks. The army could do nothing and the Marcos regime 
crumbled. 
And we need to combine the principle of non-violence 
with spreading information. There has to be a link between 
international opinion and our movement at home. If some of 
us are killed during a non-violent action and nothing is re-
ported in the press, the action will serve no purpose. 
We never expected the three major publications to be 
banned in 1994. Banning on such a scale last occurred 17 
years ago, in 1977. This was a serious setback. The groups 
abroad are out of the reach of the armed forces and can follow 
and monitor everything we do. This will help to create new 
networks. 
SKEPHI/INFIGHT 
JI. Pulo Asem Raya 23 
Jakarta 13220 
Tel/Fax 62 21 4711388 
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The Dutch State against Poncke Princen 
A kind of national hysteria broke out in the Netherlands, the usually rather tolerant or even dull 
country facing the North Sea. It was the visit of human rights activist Poncke Princen that provoked 
such intense emotions. Why is Poncke Princen such a controversial figure in the Netherlands? 
For Indonesian human rights activists Poncke Princen is 
best known as the founder and chair of LPHAM, the Institute 
for the Defence of Human Rights, based in Jakarta. His cou-
rageous stance has often brought him into conflict with the 
Indonesian authorities. He was jailed under Sukarno and 
again under Suharto. It is less well known that he is Dutch-
bom and opted to become an Indonesian citizen. Poncke 
Princen is now 67 years old; he is wheel-chair bound because 
of a stroke and had surgery for skin cancer a few years ago. 
The colonial wars 
One of the darkest pages in Dutch history was the attempt 
to recolonise Indonesia after the Pacific War. Following the 
Japanese defeat in August 1945, Indonesian independence 
was inevitable. On 17 August 1945 Sukarno proclaimed in-
dependence, the first move in the post-war period of decolo-
nisation in the Asian continent. The first to be sent to restore 
Dutch rule in the former Netherlands East Indies were British 
troops, with the task of disarming the Japanese. The troops 
had a rough time as the Indonesians were not prepared to 
welcome any foreign troops. When the Dutch decided to 
send a large contingent of troops to the area, armed conflict 
became unavoidable. 
The post-war Dutch _government and parliament were 
overwhelmingly in favour of recolonising Indonesia. The 
Indonesian declaration of independence was simply ignored 
and Dutch troops were sent to Indonesia on the pretext of 
restoring law and order. But Holland was ·itself in a bad 
shape, having barely survived five years of Nazi occupation. 
The only well-groomed troops were the 7 December Division 
and the Princess Irene Brigade. Almost all the rest were con-
scripts, many of them undernourished young Dutch. Poncke 
Princen had the misfortune to be enlisted. 
But although he was not yet twenty, he already had a 
reputation of going against the stream. He was held briefly in 
detention during the German occupation. 
Although the majority of Dutch people supported the 
sending of troops to Indonesia, it is not widely recognised 
that many young men refused to take part in this unjust war. 
Organised primarily by the Dutch Communist Party, hun-
dreds of young men went into hiding to avoid the draft. Oth-
ers went to Indonesia to develop links with the Indonesians. 
A few individuals decided to join the ranks of the Republi-
cans, as the Indonesian troops were called. Poncke Princen 
was one of them and came to be seen as a deserter by the 
Dutch state. 
Once a deserter always a deserter 
The two colonial wars the Dutch launched in the former 
East Indies were called 'politionele acties' or 'police actions' 
and the name is still used in Dutch history books to this very 
day. Successive Dutch governments, including the present 
one, have not dared to touch such sensitive issues as war 
crimes perpetrated by Dutch troops and refusal to acknowl-
edge that the country was involved in a colonial war. 
On 27 December 1949, the US dragged the two warring 
parties to the negotiating table and forced the Dutch to hand 
over sovereignty to the Indonesians. Poncke princen was 
ahead of his time, fired by a healthy political intuition to side 
with the Indonesians. The 17 August proclamation of inde-
Amsterdam graffiti welcoming Poncke Princen 
pendence is still not recognised by the Dutch as this 
would mean that the sending of troops in 194 7 was an act of 
colonial aggression. 
Poncke Princen has become the catalyst for the conscience 
of the Dutch people. It is still painful for many veterans of 
that war, who fought under the pretext of restoring peace and 
order, to be asked to accept that they were deceived by the 
government and were actually participating in a colonial war. 
Rewriting history is always a painful process and accepting 
collective guilt is always awesome and difficult. For many 
Dutch, including many born after the Second World War, 
Poncke Princen remains a deserter. 
This became painfully apparent when Poncke Princen 
applied to the Dutch government for a visa to spend Christ-
mas with relatives and friends in Holland. A national hysteria 
erupted and the question was debated in every forum, includ-
ing Parliament where a a small majority was against giving 
him a visa. The Foreign Minister ignored the vote and 
granted Poncke Princen permission to come to Holland. 
Emotions ran high as right wing veteran groups thundered 
warnings of revenge, threatened an attempt on his life and 
filed a court case against him. Poncke Princen's brief visit to 
Holland had to be very low profile, no press interviews, no 
public meetings; even private meetings were tightly guarded 
secrets. The atmosphere was tense enough for the government 
to provide him with constant police protection. 
Poncke Princen is back in Indonesia, once again busy with 
C011tinued on page 7 
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Debate on nuclear energy banned 
A seminar convened by two of Indonesia's leading envi-
ronmental non-governmental organisations to discuss the 
highly contentious issue of developing nuclear power had to 
be cancelled at the last minute because police permission was 
not granted. 
The convener, Muhammad Anung told a very disap-
pointed crowd of participants and journalists who had turned 
up to cover the event that objections had been raised by the 
Ministry of the Interior because of the presence of "one of the 
speakers". He said it was clear that this was directed at Ab-
durrclhman Wahid; newly elected chair of the mass organisa-
tion, Nahdatul U/ama, who was not listed as a speaker but 
who was going to attend. He is known to be vigorously op-
posed to the building of a nuclear power pl3?t• Gus Dur, as 
he is popularly known, has warned that he will camp out and 
start a fast at Mount Muria in Central Java, the site of the 
country's first nuclear power plant, if plans for the plant go 
ahead. 
The NGOs involved in organising the seminar are 
WALHI, the Indonesian Forum for the Envimnment (and a 
member of Friends of the Earth), and MAI, the Anti-Nuclear 
Society of Indonesia. The venue was at the Erasmus Hu is, the 
Dutch cultural centre in Jakarta. 
Anung said he thought that the refusal was prompted by 
fears that the debate would generate a major campaign to 
oppose the building of a nuclear power plant in Indonesia. 
Mulyana W. Kusuma, executive director of the Indonesian 
Legal Aid Foundation, strongly criticised the ban. The Foun-
dation is currently suing the police for banning one of its own 
seminars, to discuss land issues last July. [Jakarta Post, 
23 .XII.1994] 
What the Jakarta Post report and an accompanying edi-
torial on the same day fail to mention is that the real source 
of the ban is almost certainly Dr B.J. Habibie, Minister for 
Technology and Research, who is the prime mover behind the 
nuclear power project. Habibie was also clearly behind the 
banning of three major political weeklies last June at a time 
when his controversial deal for the purchase of 39 warships 
from Germany was under public scrutiny. 
Chinese songs not allowed 
Police in Surakarta and Banyumas, Central Java banned 
the singing of Mandarin songs at hotels and other places of 
entertainment whe~e parties were being held to celebrate 
Christmas and the New Year. The Surakarta police chief said 
the ban was impose "to prevent racial conflict." [Jakarta 
Post, 23.XII.1994] 
Similar bans have been imposed in past years over the 
festive season. Indonesia which has a population of some 
three million citizens of Chinese origin is the only country in 
Southeast Asia that bans the use of Chinese characters by 
shops and will not allow any newspapers to be published in 
Chinese. 
1994 a year of setbacks 
Human rights lawyers from the Indonesian Human Rights 
Foundation (YLBIIl) have described 1994 as a year of set-
backs for human rights in Indonesia. Chair of the Foundation 
Buyung Nasution said the atmosphere w~s now so appalling 
that people "are even afraid to talk about human rights". He 
~("I ~\~ I: ::. ~ 
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mentioned in particular the banning of three major pol~ti.cal 
weeklies in June and the trials of a number of labour activists 
in North Sumatra. Following the bans, newspapers "have 
become afraid to print controversial stories and to hurt those 
in power", said Buyung. 
Mulyana W. Kusuma, Executive Dire~tor of. the ~ounda­
tion, said that government Part!cipa~on" m v~ous mterna-
tional conferences on human nghts is nothing more th~ 
rhetoric". He was particularly angry with the bans on pubhc 
meetings, saying that fifteen meetings and seminars had been 
prevented from taking place during the year. 
But the Foundation also noted a greater awareness in so-
ciety, reflected in the fact that a number of organisations have 
sought to challenge government policies in the law courts. 
Referring specifically to East Timor, Buyung said that the 
government should review its policy. "It should have the 
moral courage to settle the East Timor case which has been a 
burden for Indonesia and has been very costly". [Jakarta 
Post, 10.XII.1994] 
Peasants from Madura seek justice 
Four farmers representing thousands of people in the 
Sampang district of the island of Madura were in Jakarta in 
December to renew pressure over the killing in September 
1993 of four Madurese in defence of their land. The shooting 
occurred when government officials vlsited the area to meas-
ure the land being acquired for a large reservoir, without 
consulting the people who work the land .. 
The four representatives said that officials from the na-
tional land agency have again been in the area to measure up 
land even though the dispute has not yet been resolved. 
"We want the incident settled and those guilty brought to 
trial. Only after that will we agree to further discuss deals 
concerning our land'', said M. Makruf, one of the four men. 
They took their complaints to the National Commission 
for Human Rights, asking that all efforts to acquire the land 
should be halted until the matter is fully resolved in court .. 
They also urged members of the Commission to visit the area 
and talk to people about the continuing practices of intimida-
tion. 
The Commission secretary, Baharuddin Lopa was decid-
edly unhelpful however, saying the people of Madura should 
give the government two or three years to prosecute those 
responsible for the killings. [Jakarta Post, 20.XII.1994] 
Nuku's appeal turned down 
The Supreme Court has turned down an appeal for clem-
ency from Nuku Suleiman, a human rights activist who was 
jailed in the Jakarta District Court last year for four years. He 
was charged with "insulting the President". The four-year 
sentence was increased to five years by the Jakarta High 
Court and this is the sentence he will now have to serve fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's verdict. The charges related to 
the distribution of stickers accusing Suharto of numerous 
massacres. 
The High Court said it increased the sentence because the 
accused "used the court-room as an arena for political propa-
ganda to insult the President and the judiciary". [Kompas, 
4.1.1995] 
14 TAPOL Bulletin No. 127, February 1995 
A political slur that will stick for life 
As the thirtieth anniversary of the Suharto-led militarr seizure of P?Wer. in Indonesia. in October 
1965 appro.aches, TAPOL has decided to devote space in each Bulleti'! this year .to ~a~wus aspects 
of military rule and Suharto's seizure of power. This time, our focus is on the vindictive measures 
against people accused of alleged involvement in the G30S, t?e e~ent t?at paved the way for Su-
harto's power grab. Hundreds of thousands of people are still stigmatised, 30 years on. But the 
stigma is also used to punish people with no PK/ links at all 
Kedung Om bo peasants stigmatised 
Two villagers are still being stigmatised because the ini-
tials 'ET' were stamped on their identity cards. This was 
their punishment for demanding fair compensation for land 
taken from them for the World Bank-funded Kedung Ombo 
dam that removed thousands of peasants from their land in 
the late 1980s. 
The initials 'ET' stand for 'ex-tapol' and are stamped on 
the identity cards o(Jl!lyone who spent time in prison for al-
leged involvement with the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI) before it was banned in 1965, or for anyone branded as 
a communist suspect. Allegations of PKI involvement are 
automatically linked to alleged involvement in the G30S 
(September 30 Movement), the name of the group of army 
officers who kidnapped and killed members of the army gen-
eral command. This event triggered Suharto's counter-move, 
setting in motion his gradual seizure of power. 
The 'ET' stigma makes them liable to a range of civil 
rights abuses and is a form of political discrimination that 
still afflicts millions of citizens in Suharto's New Order re-
gime thirty years after the events of October 1965. 
But Tjitro Pawiro Kasman and Dalimin Resopawiro 
were never arrested as communist suspects nor were they ever 
branded as PKI suspects. It was only when they, and others 
with them, decided to make a stand for decent compensation 
for their land in the late 1980s that the authorities thought up 
a new form of punishment. The decision to mark their iden-
tity cards with 'ET' followed a vindictive attack on the 
Kedung Ombo peasants by President Suharto who accused 
them of 'behaving like ex-PKI' in their struggle for justice. 
At first, Tjitro Pawiro and Dalimin were unaware of the 
consequences of the initials; not understanding what they 
stood for, they thought little of the matter. They concentrated 
instead on fighting for compensation. On one occasion they 
and many other villagers, all with 'ET' stamped on their 
cards, were summoned by the sub-district office and told to 
abandon their fight over compensation but they refused to 
comply. 
Tjitro Pawiro told Forum Keadilan that he spent weeks 
frantically trying to move his belongings out of the reach of 
the reservoir waters as they rose steadily, covering part of his 
land. In the end, he set up a homestead on a plot beyond the 
water's edge and as things quietened down, he turned his 
attention to this other problem. 
When he realised that the initials would have conse-
quences not only for his own civil rights but also for those of 
his children, he asked the village head to have them removed, 
only to be told that this was a matter not for him but for 
the sub-district administrator. 
False witness in court 
He then turned for help to the Semarang Legal Aid Insti-
tute (LBH) who advised him to go to court to have his name 
cleared. When the case came up in the Boyolali district court, 
government officials testified that he had been a member of 
the PKI's youth and peasant organisations, that his father 
whose house he inherited, used to display the hammer-and-
sickle in his house. Many other totally false allegations were 
made in court but despite vigorous rebuttal of these lies, he 
lost the case. 
To add to his problems, on a number of occasions while 
the case was being heard, local officials tried to bully him 
into dropping the case. The village head also warned him that 
it was a waste of time trying to get the initials removed. 
An appeal to a higher court was made but without_ success 
and the case is now before the Supreme Court with little 
chance of an early verdict. The Supreme Court's decision 
announced last July, in favour of the claim for compensation 
by several dozen Kedung Ombo villagers [see TAPOL Bulle-
tin No 124, August 1994], prompted the hope that things 
might go his way, but now that the Supreme Court has re-
versed its own decision [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 126, De-
cember 1994], all hopes have been dashed. 
His identity card was renewed several times in the past, 
each time still with the damning initials. Now, at last, they 
have been removed but he has been advised by his lawyer that 
this is not the end of the matter. If he cannot get his name 
cleared by a court verdict, the 'ET' stigma will remain with 
him for the rest of his days and will also haunt his children. 
[Forum Keadilan, 9.1.1995] 
'The PKI stigma has shattered my life' 
Sartiman, 47, employed for twenty years by the for-
eign-owned oil company, Asamera Ltd, in Aceh, North Su-
matra, was sacked after it was alleged during political 
screening that his political background was 'unclean' . His 
two brothers, Tukimin Babdi, 40, and Mardiono, 36, also 
employed by Asamera, suffered the same fate. 
The witch-hunt began when the Personnel Department 
claimed that his late father, Suwondo, had been secretary of 
the Kampung Jawa, Aceh, branch of the peasants' union, 
BTI, which was banned after October 1965, along with doz-
ens of organisations linked to the PKI. Here is a summary of 
Sartiman's story as told to Forum Keadilan [22.XII.1994) 
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At the time of the screening, in 1985, Sartiman had been 
working for the company for 18 years. He was screened in 
1967 when he started with the company and found to be 
'clean'. By the mid-1980s, he was head of Internal Relations 
and being given various trustworthy assignments. However 
he was subjected to screening for a second time and when the 
BTI allegation was discovered, the state oil company, 
Pertamina, insisted on further investigations. In 1987, the 
Asainera Field Manager, L.R. Langford, decreed his dis-
missal, stating that this was because he did not come up to 
scratch in his job. 
Sartiman was convinced his father had not been a BTI 
activist. He spent two years trying to find the real Suwondo 
who had been the BTI branch secretary and eventually found 
him in East Aceh. The man had been incarcerated for many 
years as an untried prisoner on the island of Buru. He gladly 
gave Sartiman a declaration that he had been the secretary of 
the BTI branch in question. 
Back home, the local military command accepted the ex-
planation, also notifying the Pertamina central office. Sarti-
man hoped that he would now get his job back but the com-
pany refused to take him back, saying they were now 'over-
manned'. 
The slur, says Sartiman, has damaged his social standing. 
People are unwilling to visit him. When he invited hundreds 
of people to a gathering for the Mau/id holiday, only six 
turned up. His children complain of being jeered at by their 
school-mates for being 'involved with the PKI' and want to 
stop going to school. 
In an auempt to clear his name, Sartiman took Asamera 
to court, demanding that they publish statements in the press 
apologising to him and his family and seeking damages of 
five billion rupiahs. He won his case in the district court and 
also in the high court, but the company has now appealed to 
the Supreme Court for a reversal of the verdict. 
''/ have no idea what the result will be. I have been 
gravely damaged and my family's good name has been tar-
nished. I am entitled to damages. " 
Cleansing parties of 'PKI' 
A furious row has broken out about the presence of al-
leged PKI sympathisers inside the Indonesian Democratic 
Party, the POI. While the purpose of the witch-hunt is to 
discredit the POI and undermine its potential for winning 
votes at the next general election, it draws attention once 
again to the continuing discriminati.on ag~ anyone 
branded as a PKI sympathiser and to theu exclusion from the 
governing bodies of the political parties, even at the lowest 
levels. 
The row centres around the leader of the West Java 
branch of the party, Djadjang Kumiadi, 56. The West Java 
military command's security agency, the Bakorstanasda, an-
nounced in December that his position as chair was untenable 
because he was allegedly from "an unclean environment". 
The charge relates to claims that he was an activist in the 
'ASU' wing of the former PNI, one of the components in the 
POI. This wing was seen as being close to the PKI in 1965 
and was purged from the party very soon after the military 
took over. 
Djadjang Kurniadi denies the charge but has nevertheless 
been compelled by the furore to withdraw as chair and is 
considering legal action against Bakorstanasda to clear his 
name. 
While this row was simmering, the military commander 
of Central Java, Major-General Soejono, came forward with 
charges that local PD I leaders in Kudus, Magelang and 
Banyumas are also "politically unclean" . 
The press coverage of the row stresses repeatedly that all 
persons holding positions in the political parties are subjected 
to political screening, the so-called 'litsus test'. The tone of 
the discourse is one of righteous indignation that people al-
ready screened should now be subjected to such allegations. 
The anger is understandable because these charges can have 
devastating consequences for the individual concerned. 
Djadjang, for one, has complained that members of his family 
are already suffering as a result. 
Nowhere, however, is there any expression of amazement 
or disgust that such discrimination still exists and that, as one 
of Indonesia's most outspoken human rights lawyers, the late 
Yap Thiam Hien, said niany years ago, "ex-PKI prisoners" 
and others tainted with the PKI brush are "civilly dead". 
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~oirie s~Iillnars and alloWillg Others to proctea Without hin-drance~ The authorities have ~ palticUlar made use of ArtiCJe I 
1 
• S 10 of the Crlrilinal ·Code .which speaks of the. need for .Ci .po-
1 lice permit for e\ien~ that c0uld disturb public disorder. · . ·. 
. ·. · .. ·· In fact, many organisations. that are pan. of the · growing 
pro-democracy movement are turning their backs on· so~Ied 
te<1uirements of the law. The new spirit of resistance now 
, abr~d has ryreant tha.t many groups do what they want to do, . 
never stopping to ask for anyone's permission. There is a 
yawiling gap bet\Veen what the authOrities want, With their 
·~ri,fy' approach' and what happens at the grass-roots. 1995 
pro~s to be an interesting and eventful yeai. 
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ACEH 
More trials in Aceh 
In December a new series of trials started in Aceh, this time against members of a sect commonly 
known by the name Jubah Putih (White Robes). The flamboyant leader, Tengku Bantaqiah, heads a 
religious congregation called Pesantren Dayah Babu/ Mukaramah in West Aceh. 
According to press reports, five trials are scheduled: the 
defendants are Tengku Bantaqiah, 46 years and four of his 
followers, Nurhayati, Tengku Syamaun, Muhammad Amin 
and Syamsul Bahari. This is not the first time for members 
of this sect to go on trial. In September 1987, four members 
of the Jubah Putih sect were tried and sentenced. The sect 
held a spectacular action in Sigli, protesting against the sell-
ing of alcohol and the opening of food shops during the fast-
ing period. Tengku Bantaqiah managed to escape by fleeing 
into the dense jungle. For several years there were no press 
reports about him and his followers. In 1990 the Governor of 
Aceh, Ibrahim Hasan took the sect under his wing and gave it 
200 million rupiah to support the congregation. Now, sud-
denly, Tengku Bantaqiah was brought on trial on subversion 
charges of being involved in GAM (Free Aceh Movement). 
Tengku Bantaqiah and the ganja trade 
There are two serious charges against Tengku Bantaqiah: 
involvement in the production and trafficking of ganja and 
being the logistics commander of GAM. The first allegation 
would appear to be true, Tengku Bantaqiah has urged his 
followers to grow ganja bushes to earn money for the sect. 
Ganja is traditionally widely used among Acehnese but since 
the flower power days of the seventies, trade in ganja has 
become a lucrative business and Acehnese ganja has become 
an export commodity. Most of the ganja trade is in the hands 
of local security officers, military and police alike. It is not 
unlikely that, by starting his own small business, Tengku 
Bantaqiah was seen as a t'Ompetitor who should be elimi-
nated. 
The second allegation, Tengku Bantaqiah's involvement 
in activities of GAM, is possibly a typical military intelligence 
ploy. This is not the first time that GAM activities have been 
linked by the Indonesian authorities to the ganja trade. Politi-
cal activities linked with criminal activities is the message the 
authorities want to convey in Aceh. It was convenient for the 
authorities to link this case with GPK (Security Disrupter 
Gangs) activities, the name commonly used in Indonesia to 
describe the GAM movement. It is also clear that the Indone-
sian security officers in Aceh are using religious congrega-
tions to fight the influence of GAM. 
(Mis )using religion 
Simultaneously, security officers and local leaders are cir-
culating tens of thousands of pamphlets to appeal to GAM 
activists to come down from the mountains and forests and 
surrender. In the Sigli area a Muslim leader, Tengku Mu-
hammad Arsyat of the Darussa 'adah congregation, explained 
that close relatives of those still in the mountains are eager to 
be back with their husbands, sons and brothers. Tengku Ar-
syat is confident that the security forces will be kind to those 
who surrender. The pamphlets, written in Acehnese, reflect a 
religious tone of forgiveness, emphasising the reunification of 
broken families. Lt. Colonel Suherman, the military com-
mander of the area, confirmed on 22 November 1994 that the 
leafleting was done with the full backing of the authorities. 
He hopes that those still in the mountains will listen and re-
spond to the religious appeal. 
In the same period Colonel Djoko Subroto, commander of 
the military sub-district Korem 011/Lilawangsa, organised an 
acara syukuran (thanksgiving celebration) after Friday pray-
ers in the main mosque in Matang Kuli, North Aceh, to give 
thanks for peace and order having been restored in the area. 
The colonel referred to the four ex-guerrillas in the Pidie area 
who surrendered and are now safely back with their families. 
He will not, of course, refer to the cruelties and barbarism of 
the Indonesian military which led many Acehnese families to 
flee to the mountains or to neighbouring Malaysia. Earlier, 
Karimuddin Hasjbullah, District Chief of North Aceh, told 
the community to use empty plots in the Matang Kuli sub-
district to grow fruit trees. These empty plots could well be 
land deserted by people who fled the oppression. The 
thanksgiving celebration ended by Colonel Djoko Subroto 
handing over money to develop the Matang Kuli mosque. 
The huge efforts by the security forces, including the 
(mis)use of religious means, is an indication that the security 
situation is far from normal. The military nowadays concen-
trate on territorial management codenamed Operasi Jaring . 
Isolating guerrillas from the population. 
The Indonesian military authorities describe the activities 
of GAM as 'a thorn in the flesh' and admit that regular 
clashes still occur. Their latest operation is called Operasi 
Jaring V, the main aim of which is to isolate GAM fighters 
from the population. The authorities hope to achieve this with 
a 'special guidance programme'. The operation includes a 
special unit of 25 people brought in from army HQ in Jakarta, 
with training in modem mass-communication methods, to 
give briefings in the villages. Infrastructural improvements 
are also part of Operasi Jaring. 
The military argue that isolated villages in Aceh are an 
easy prey for the propaganda of the rebels. Military com-
mander Major-General Albertus Pranowo has acknowledged 
that Acehnese villagers often regard the Indonesian military 
as infidels. Easy access to isolated areas will improve inte-
gration with the rest of Indonesia. Another worry is GAM' s 
stock of weapons. Colonel Robin Mukav, assistent for opera-
tions of the North Sumatra military command, has explained 
that apart from weapons captured from Indonesian soldiers, 
imported weapons are also being used by the guerillas., fi-
nanced, he claims, by the profitable ganja trade. 
Reports of clashes between GAM and the Indonesian 
forces are rarely carried in the press but this does not neces-
sarily reflect the true situation. Aceh is a very isolated region, 
in some respects even more so than East Timor. Human 
rights violations occur daily in both areas but the abuses in 
Aceh are less likely to be reported. Independent observers and 
UN special rapporteurs have never been allowed to visit 
Aceh. It is a region where the Indonesian authorities have a 
lot to hide. 
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Abuses escalate in East Timor 
In the period since November when there was a week of demonstrations in East Timor, the human 
rights situation in East Timor has deteriorated. On 1 January, a massacre occurred in Baucau and 
there have been numerous arrests and reported disappearances. Once again, the forces of occupa-
tion have opened fire on defenceless protesters. 
The many protests that shook Dili during November led to 
about 130 people being arrested [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 
126], many of whom were tortured. The BBC correspondent 
in Jakarta reported on 8 December that young people re-
garded as 'potential trouble-makers' "were reportedly stripped 
naked, beaten and tortured with electric shocks by the mili-
tary. They and others were also ordered, apparently by the 
local mayor, to have their heads shaved as a further deter-
rent". 
According to the strategy of short, sharp detentions, most 
were released after a few days but live in fear of re-arrest. 
Some are likely to face trial. 
'~~ vulagers eXe~uted ~ ¢914 'bjo!id i •. 
Six Villagers from the Village· of Garialia ~r~ sllo( dead • 
on 12 ·January by IndoneSian soldiers. This cold•btooded exe- • 
cution ooetitred a few hours after a clash bclWeen Indonesian • 
·troops and the ·~ Timor resistance arfuy,.FALINTIL, dm.- · 
ing which ~.young guerrilla was. inj\11'00 mthe hip .arid four . 
Indonesian $oldfors were killed. Gariaful is located in between • 
· !i:~u:::::~ ~:!~!!:~: .. :,::~~=: 
.•·. . In a .Pre$$ rel~, ~ CNRM ruili$J the siX Victims· a:s 
Jose. Nunes~ JS ye3fs oI<( Gartalia villag~ head; i\~1 Nones, 
. 30~ Village head of ·the .lieighbouritig village of B~a .. (or · 
Bahuooa); VidQr, .Z4, pfGariana-MaUt>ata~. AU.gtisto Plnfo 
Nunes; 20, of Gariari.a; Alnerico · J\r..ujo, 20, ot LC<>tiia~ 
Liqufo; and Osario SO.res, . al59 of Leotila.;Liquic: · 
. . The execution was camed out . by . trO(')ps from . the '.local 
military · command (Kodim) un~er the command .of 1st Lieri- . 
tenent Jeremias Kase; intelligence depufy of the command. · ..•. • 
The day . after thC. exeeutioris; .• the . bldonesian army . 
claimed that six guerrillas trad been killed •\wheri they were · 
trappe(I after a .battle with g()\remmen~ troops";<.Tbis.• dtj~r~ · 
ate Jabticaifun was widely repc)ited in the world m¢dia \ ..• 
Six daYs after. the executions, the· BBC carrespondent in 
J8kart,a. s3id.ffiat repOrts from ieSidents.in East Timor directly. 
contradict the ailily's verSion and eorifirtn the CNRM's aC-
cotint. She reported: .· . 
"Independent sour~s told the BBCthat three Indonesian 
soldiers had been killed in ·a colffrontatiOn With th~ resis-
tance, . and when the arniy failed to find those responsible, a . 
local commander rounded up six civilians suspected ofsym~ .· 
pathising with the ·guerrillas and executed thein in ·· cold . 
blood." 
"We'll cut them to pieces" 
Speaking shortly after the events of mid-November when 
protests in East Timor had been widely reported worldwide, 
Colonel Kiki Syahnakri, regional commander for East Timor, 
did not mince his words: 
We will not tolerate any more disturbances or demon-
strations in East Timor, especially in the capital, Dili. If 
repetitions occur, the armed forces will def firmly against 
everyone involved as well as the organisers. I will not hesi-
tate to cut them to pieces ['sikat'] because we've pleaded with 
them enough and our patience is exhausted. [Jawa Pos, 
1.XII.1994] 
The colonel was clearly frustrated that the army's hands 
were tied in November because of the presence of many for-
eign journalists, forcing the security forces to restrain them-
selves and avoid using firearms. There were a number of 
bloody incidents [see TAPOL Bulletin No 126] but in some 
instances the protesters got the upper hand; on one occasion 
they even had the police with their riot shields and trun-
cheons on the run. 
Mobile Brigade moves in 
A new element in the strategy of the army of occupation is 
the decision to give the police, in particular its special force, 
the Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB), responsibility for security in 
Dili. Nowadays, statements from Dili about protests and ar-
rests are made not by the army but by the police chief, Colo-
nel Sugianto Andreas. 
The move was announced by national chief of police Gen-
eral Banurusman in Surabaya as two BRIMOB companies 
from Kupang and Bali were sent to Dili for special duties. 
"With the army focusing on the GPK (the regime's term for 
the armed resistance), it will be BRIMOB's task to safeguard 
security." [Pikiran Rakyat, 12.XII.1994] 
Meanwhile at the receiving end, chief of police Colonel 
Sugianto Andreas said BRIMOB forces would be brought up 
to battalion strength for special duties in Dili. As yet these 
troops have no barracks of their own and live in tents behind 
the Comoro district police command. [Jawa Pos, 
12.XII.1994] 
Using police has become a policy of the armed forces 
throughout Indonesia, but everywhere the police are known to 
be ruthless. In East Timor, the shift has not and will not 
change the level of brutality. Indeed, because it is an occupied 
territory, all the forces behave much more ferociously in East 
Timor. Moreover, the Indonesian police is not a civilian force 
but part of the armed forces. The police carry arms and BRI-
MOB is a particularly tough and vicious section of the force. 
Protesters shot dead in Baucau 
The New Year started with a serious incident in Baucau 
located about 120 kms east of Dili. Baucau is the headquar~ 
ters of the troops garrisoned in East Timor and has the army's 
main air-base nearby. On 2 January, troops opened fire on a 
crowd of about a thousand unarmed protesters gathered out-
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side a church. According to some reports, as many as five 
people were shot dead, with many more wounded. According 
to a press release from the CNRM, the death toll would have 
been much higher but for the fact that many fled the location 
and took shelter behind a small hill nearby. To hide evidence 
of the massacre, troops were quickly out on the streets, hosing 
away blood. 
The crowds had gathered to protest the killing of an East 
Timorese named Armanda Ximenes by an Indonesian mi-
grant on New Year's Day, in yet another clash between the 
two communities. A similar incident had sparked protests in 
Dili on 12 November. 
The unrest in Baucau spread to other towns, including 
Ermera, south-west of Dili, Viqueque and Dili itself. 
There are pent-up feelings of anger towards the many In-
donesians now dominating commerce and the administration, 
so this murder quickly led to attacks on Indonesian-owned 
property and vehicles; one of the two main markets which is 
located in the old part of the town, built by the Portuguese, 
was completed destroyed by fire. It is here that most Indone-
sian shops and restuarants are located. 
It was later reported that 700 Buginese had taken refuge 
in the military base. Many were quoted as saying the one 
thing they wanted was to get out of East Timor. 
Demonstration in Dili 
On 9 January, to coincide with the talks in Geneva on the 
future of East Timor, a demonstration took place in Dili, with 
banners and posters calling for self-determination and the 
release of the jailed resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao. There 
was also a demonstration outside the gates of the University 
of East Timor. 
The atmosphere throughout the country is described by 
local activists as very tense , with a sharp escalation in the 
level of spying by 'intel' agents. According to one report: 
Troops continuously stalk the streets in groups of 10 or 
J 2 men armed with metre-long sticks. Some are dressed in 
black jackets with an eagle's wings embossed on it; others 
wear yellow jackets sporting the word 'keamanan' (security). 
Christmas could not be celebrated properly as most people 
preferred to stay at home rather than visit friends and rela-
tives ... . A fully-armed riot squad travelling in six to eight 
vehicles patrolled the churches, the Vila Verde Cathedral 
and the churches in Becora and Motae/. 
The writer spoke of military reinforcements arriving by 
sea and from West Timor, bringing heavy equipment, includ-
ing artillery and tanks. A new identity-card operation was 
launched, with the military blocking all the roads le~ding 
into Dili. He names many people who have been detained. 
Henrique Belmira, 43, was severely tortured by an intelli-
gence unit known as the SGI.. He now had injuries on his 
arms and legs and a wound on the temple that needed seven 
stitches. r~ ~!I i 
\\ 
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Another source reported that, following the 9 January 
demonstration, many people were picked up at night. "The 
situation is much worse than before. Every place, coffee-
shops, restaurants, shopping centres are full of these bloody 
guys." 
On 16 January, Colonel Sugianto announced that 28 
people would go on trial soon. They inc~u~e eleven Ea_st 
Timorese and one Buginese who will face cnmmal charges m 
Baucau, and sixteeen who will face charges related to the p~o­
independence demonstration in Dili on 9 January. The pohce 
chief warned that they were still looking for other Timorese 
who "may have been involved in the protest". [Reuter, 
16.XIl.1995] 
Attack on Dili newspaper 
A gang of youths from Pemuda Pancasila, an organisa-
tion with a reputation for thuggery, attacked the office of the 
Dili newspaper, Suara Timor Timur, destroying several com-
puters and other equipment. The marauders were looking for 
Jacob Herin, a journalist with the paper who had reported an 
attempt on the life of the leader of their organisation, Ach-
mad Alkatiri. The report appears to have been an uncontro-
versial account of the incident. 
Herin was later found by the mob, dragged away to Alka-
tiri's home and severely beaten. Although the incident was 
widely reported in the Indonesian press with several officials 
condemning it, no-one has been arrested for this criminal 
attack on the newspaper and one of its journalists. 
This is the latest in a series of attacks on the newspaper 
whose reporting of events in East Timor has antagonised 
staunchly pro-Indonesian groups. 
Three Timorese arrested in Sorong 
Three young East Timorese who were trying to flee to 
Australia were apprehended in Sorong, a region in the west 
of West Papua. According to Major-General Ketut Wirdhana, 
the military commander of the province, the three had come 
to Sorong to take part in a football match with a local team 
but remained behind after the others returned to East Timor. 
In one Indonesian press report, the three have been named 
as Lino Gutteres, 23, Jose de Costa, 26 and Luis Pinto, 19, 
all from Dili. 
Wirdhana said that the three had been able to obtain 
identity cards, certificates of good conduct and passports in 
order to make their escape. They will be sent back to East 
Timor where they are to face criminal charges. 
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Army's handling of massacre condemned by UN 
A report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Killings has 
roundly condemned the army's handling of the November 1991 massacre, describing it as "a 
planned military operation". The report bears out all the criticisms made of Jakarta's own 
in·vestigations of the massacre and should compel western governments to reconsider their supine 
acceptance of the army's version. 
The Special Rapporteur, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, visited East 
Timor in July last year in compliance with a decision of the 
UN Human Rights Commission. His objectives were: 
... to assess the (Indonesian) Government's fulfilment of 
the standards under international law by law-enforcement 
officers and its obligations to ir,1vestigate all allegations of 
summary executions, to bring to justice their perpetrators, to 
provide compensation to the families of the victims and to 
prevent their recurrence. 
The massacre occurred when troops opened fire on a huge 
crowd of demonstrators outside and inside the Santa Cruz 
cemetery in Dili on 12 November 1991. They had gone to the 
cemetery to pay tribute to a young East Timorese who had 
been shot dead two weeks earlier by Indonesian troops. 
Figures compiled on the basis of East Timorese investigations 
have revealed that 273 people were shot dead, a large number 
were wounded, and many more disappeared. More recent 
investigations have shown that scores, perhaps hundreds, of 
the wounded taken to the military hospital in Dili were put to 
death in what has been called 'the second massacre'. 
The Special Rapporteur's report deals specifically with 
the investigations undertaken by two bodies set up by 
President Suharto, the National Commission of Inquiry and 
the Honorary Military Council and by various authorities in 
East Timor. 
A devastating indictment 
The findings of the Special Rapporteur were devastating 
on all counts. In an assessment of the government's 
responsibility, the Special Rapporteur rejected the claim that 
the troops were responding to threatening behaviour. There 
was no evidence that the demonstrators carried firearms and 
the sticks produced in court at the various trials were used to 
hold up banners, not as weapons. Film footage had shown 
soldiers moving around the cemetery "without any fear or 
constraint while others (were) beating people on the 
ground ... demonstrators who were trying to flee the scene of 
the killings were shot in the back (and) after the shooting had 
stopped, soldiers went on stabbing, kicking and beating the 
survivors (including the wounded)". He concluded that the 
claims of some officials that the security forces had fired in 
self-defence were "unsubstantiated". 
The Special Rapporteur was scathing about the 
investigations carried out by the police, arguing that, given 
that the police is a part of the armed forces, "the conditions 
for an independent and impartial investigation were not 
present". In particular, there were no autopsies of the 19 
bodies buried in the military cemetery, nor was "any ballistic 
examination conducted to connect the bullets fired with the 
weapons of the security forces present at the cemetery". 
As for the police examination of witnesses of the 
massacre, "they were questioned on their involvement in the 
organisation of the demonstration rather than on possible 
unlawful acts... by members of the security forces or the 
identity of the killed and disappeared". 
The Special Rapporteur was clearly dumbfounded by the 
methods adopted by Indonesia's National Commission of 
Inquiry (NCI) to excavate graves where bodies of the victims 
are believed to have been buried. He was told that "a tractor 
had been used". In the careful language used throughout the 
Report, the Special Rapporteur said he "(could) not help 
being surprised that such an indiscriminate means of digging, 
contrary to the basic methodology of any expert exhumation 
and likely to be detrimental to the outcome of any subsequent 
forensic analysis, was used". 
~~~~~~~~~ 
Bacre Waly Ndiaye (right) in Jakarta. On the left is Baharuddin 
Lopa, secretary of the National Commission/or Human Rights. 
As for the atmosphere in which the NCI conducted its 
investigations, "most eye-witnesses interviewed were "in 
prison or military hospital and ... they were monitored by the 
security forces and not conducted confidentially". Elsewhere, 
the report said that families were "afraid of reporting the 
death or disappearance of relatives (for fear of being) brought 
to court for having links with the clandestine resistance or for 
having supported the demonstration.. . Most were too afraid 
even to report to the Bishop." 
The Special Rapporteur was clearly dissatisfied that 
neither the report of the Honorary Military Council nor the 
final report of the NCI have been made public. He was also 
dissatisfied that the district attorney had played no role in the 
investigations, indeed "his office was not competent in 
offences involving military personnel, The only actions taken 
by the District Attorney were related to the prosecution of 
participants in the demonstration." Because victims of human 
~ghts ~buses have no acc~ss to ~e judicial system, 
complamts have to be filed with the pohce which belongs to 
the armed forces. In practice therefore, investigations are 
rarely concluded. This can hardly be called an effective 
remedy." 
As for compensation for the victims, procedures were 
"ineffective and cumbersome. Members of the public with a 
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human rights grievance face the daunting prospect of 
complaining to the armed forces, the very authority they 
believe to be responsible." 
Killings could recur 
Stressing that none of the lessons regarding the behaviour 
of the security forces had been drawn, leading the Special 
Rapporteur came to the conclusion "that the conditions that 
allowed the Santa Cruz killings to occur are still present. In 
particular members of the security forces have not be held 
accountable and continue to enjoy virtual impunity". 
With regard to actions taken against members of the 
security forces, the Special Rapporteur pointed out that "none 
of the few military personnel accused was charged with 
homicide, serious assault or for having committed enforced 
disappearances". He went on: 
The inappropriately light sentences on the few members 
of the armed forces accused ... in no way provide a deterrent 
for the recurrence of a similar tragedy in the future. .. and 
illustrate the little importance given to the respect of the 
right to life by the Indonesian enforcement officials in East 
Timor.... there was an unreasonable disparity between the 
sentences passed upon the perpetrators and upon the victims; 
the latter were in fact those really blamed for the killings ... 
(which is) illustrative of an implacable determination to 
suppress political dissent (rather) than a genuine 
commitment to protect the right to life and prevent 
extrajudicial executions. " 
Stop calling it an 'incident' 
A key recommendation of the Special Rapporteur which 
he said was crucial to reaching a solution to the problems 
facing East Timor was "for the Government . . . to recognise 
its responsibility and declare that killings and not an 
'incident' took place in Santa Cruz". 
The Special Rapporteur called for a new inquiry involving 
the participation of experts internationally recognised for 
their objectivity and competence which would reduce the fear 
and mistrust among the East Timorese which were so detri-
mental to the NCI investigation". 
He stressed the need for a civilian police force under the 
authority of the Prosecutor, in effect calling for the demili-
terisatioit of East Timor. He recommended a "drastic reduc-
tion of the military presence in East Timor (as) a pre-
requisite for confidence building measures allowing families 
to feel safe enough to report about their missing or killed 
relatives. This reduction should not only affect combat units 
but all troops present in the territory, including territorial 
battalions and military intelligence." 
Other recommendations focused on ensuring the presence 
of independent NGOs in East Timor for investigation, 
monitoring and legal assistance and the need for Indonesian 
and international NGOs to be allowed full access. He also 
called for the establishment of a commission for human 
rights in East Timor, pointing out that Indonesia's National 
Commission for Human Rights "is not the most appropriate 
mechanism to deal with human rights violations in East 
Timor", nor is it trusted by the population. 
National Commission visits East Timor 
It is hardly a coincidence that within a month of the 
publication of the Special Rapporteur's report, the National 
Commission for Human Rights made its first visit to East 
Timor. The East Timorese member of the Commission, 
Clementia dos Reis Amaral, had some harsh words to 
deliver, saying that civil servants and armed forces personnel 
need to restore public confidence in themselves. Possibly 
EdSf'tIMOR • 
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picking up the Special Rapporteur's profound 
dissatisfaction with the role of the police as a civilian law-
enforcement agency, he said the police must be recognised by 
the government as the official law enforcers, and they should 
moreover comply with 'existing procedures' . However, he 
steered clear of the basic institutional problems raised by the 
UN expert and had nothing to say, in public at least, about 
the need for demilitarisation. 
We must not summon anybody for questioning at night or 
in places other than the police station. Anybody who is 
summoned for questioning must be accompanied by a legal 
counsel. 
Reis Amaral was clearly worried because the international 
community "is still making an issue of East Timor's 
integration into Indonesia" and thought that "if the human 
rights situation improved, it would help . provide a 
comprehensive solution to the issue". [Suara Pembaruan, 
27.XII.1994] 
UN Human Rights Commission should act 
The Special Rapporteur's document is to be laid before 
the UN Human Rights Commission which meets in Geneva 
in February and March. The only appropriate move is a 
resolution condemning Indonesia for the total inadequacy of 
its handling of the Santa Cruz massacre, calling for 
implementation of the Special Rapporteur's 
recommendations, along with the recommendations made 
two years ago by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, all of 
which have been ignored by Jakarta. 
At last year's session, the Commission contented itself 
with a consensus statement, a watered-down declaration 
designed to satisfy the Indonesian Government. The 
Indonesian mission invariably argues that it will ignore the 
terms of a resolution which it votes against, beguiling some 
countries into accepting the argument that a consensus 
statement will safeguard implementation. But the statement 
last year called on the Indonesian Government "to continue 
its investigation on those still missing and the circumstances 
surrounding the (Santa Cruz) matter". The Special 
Rapporteur's report reveals that such pious hopes have led 
nowhere. 
As we go to press, all the signs are that, within the 
European Union, there is little stomach for a strong move, 
fearing that this might "upset" Indonesia. Much would 
depend on the EU taking the initiative for. a resolution and for 
more special rapporteurs - on torture again and on 
disappearances - to carry out investigations in East Timor. 
Irish MEP wants UN presence in Timor 
An Irish member of the European Parliament, Niall 
Andrews, has called for UN monitors to be installed 
immediately in East Timor to protect the population from 
persistent massacres by Indonesian troops. He said a 
permanent UN office should be set up in East Timor as soon 
as possible and wants the EU to take the initiative. [Network 
Radio News, 8.1.1995] 
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Migration into East Timor must stop 
Over the past decade tens of thousands of migrants from 
Indonesia have flooded into East Timor, effectively turning 
the towns into Indonesian towns and marginalising the East 
Timorese. There could be as many as a hundred thousand 
Indonesians now settled in East Timor, besides the troops and 
their families. 
This is the cause of the urban violence that has erupted 
and could easily provide the flashpoint for further clashes in 
the near future. These clashes are clearly distinct from actions 
organised by the clandestine movement but reflect the 
profound discontent among East Timorese who are socially 
deprived and unable to compete with traders from Indonesia, 
many of them Buginese from Sulawesi who are known for 
their mobility and generations of experience as traders. For 
years there has been a serious unemployment problem for 
young East Timorese school-leavers, with Indonesians 
invariably getting most but the very menial jobs. 
The influx of Indonesians is also changing the 
composition of the population which is politically beneficial 
for Jakarta. While such large numbers of Indonesians arrive, 
the East Timorese themselves are under pressure to practise 
birth control. 
It could well be that the forces of occupation see urban 
violence as something to detract from the political thrust of 
clandestine activities and may even have provoked the recent 
incidents. They have everything to gain from the emergence 
of ethnic conflict. 
Apart from the Balinese and Javanese farmers who have 
come to East Timor under the government-sponsored 
'transmigration' programme, most migrants travel to East 
Timor on their own steam, with the encouragement of the 
authorities assisted by facilities such as easy access to land 
and the support of their own ethnic community networks. (In 
East Timor, 'transmigration' is a misnomer. The word is only 
applicable for migration within a country.) 
' The recent incidents have even got some of Indonesia's 
closest allies worried. Governor Abilio Soares said, after the 
Baucau tragedy, that he was hoping to introduce a regulation 
to repatriate all ~obless migrants'. Whether this goes ahead 
however is not for the governor to decide. Several recent 
initiatives of his - in favour of a degree of autonomy, and 
promoting the appointment of Timorese as district heads -
have been flatly rejected by Jakarta. 
It is high time for an international campaign to compel 
Indonesia to halt all further migration into East Timor. 
Vessels are known to arrive in Dili every few weeks 
disgorging hundreds of Indonesian families to swell the 
number of migrants. Ending further migration would be only 
the first step. The next step would be to consider a 
programme for the repatriation of Indonesians in East Timor. 
UN-sponsored talks inch forward 
The fifth session of the talks between the Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers in January 
represented a small but significant step forward, with agreement to hold 'all-inclusive' talks between 
East Timorese. 
The two ministers, Durao Barroso for Portugal and Ali 
Alatas for Indonesia, met in Geneva on 9 January. There was 
no progress at all on the substantive issue of self-
determination for East Timor, with the two governments still 
poles apart. But the decision about all-inclusive talks means 
that East Timorese representatives will at last been involved 
in the process. 
The stress on 'all-inclusive' talks means going far beyond 
the highly restrictive and meaningless 'reconciliation talks' 
held under Indonesian auspices, that were twice convened in 
the UK. They involved two discredited East Timorese - Lopes 
da Cruz, President Suharto's special ambassador on East 
Timor affairs and signatory of the November 1975 Balibo 
declaration that signed away East Timor's birthright, and 
Abilio Araujo, the sacked leader of Fretilin's external 
delegation. 
Even well-known East Timorese who have collaborated 
for years with the Indonesian forces of occupation, such as 
Salvador Ximenes, who attend the 'reconciliation talks', have 
spoken of the futility of speaking only to Araujo on the 'anti-
integration' side of the dispute. Manuel Carrascalao, brother 
of the former governor, also a long-time collaborator, recently 
said in an interview that "Abilio Araujo is more pro-
Indonesian than I am". 
Happy /aces after the Geneva meeting. Left to right: Durao 
Barroso, Boutros Boutros-GhaU and Ali Alatas. 
The Secretary-General's Statement issued after the 
January talks states that the East Timorese dialogue "will 
provide a forum for the continuing of free and informal 
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exchange of views" but "will not address the political status 
of East Timor". However, as many commentators have 
pointed out, who is to decide what the Timorese actually talk 
about? Unlike the UK-based talks with Indonesian diplomats 
hovering in the background and Lopes da Cruz making sure 
that Araujo toes the line, the UN-sponsored dialogue will be 
in a much better position to determine its own "free and 
informal" agenda. 
That Indonesia is out to control the agenda was made 
clear from a statement by Ali Alatas shortly after the Geneva 
confab when he said that Jose Ramos-Horta, who is co-chair 
of the CNRM (National Council for Maubere Resistance), 
could join the talks "so long as he does not raise political is-
sues". Magnanimous indeed! But if the talks are truly all-
inclusive, we can be sure that Ramos-Horta will not be the 
only one round the table keen to set a broader agenda. He 
may even find a lot of support there for the top resistance 
leader, Xanana Gusmao, now incarcerated in Jakarta, to take 
his rightful place in the talks. 
The sixth round of talks between the two ministers are 
scheduled for 19 May in New York. 
Talks unhelpful to human rights situation 
While the UN-sponsored talks move so slowly, the situa-
tion in East Timor continues to deteriorate. It would be un-
conscionable if the diplomat manoeuvrings were allowed to 
~STTIMOR 
stand in the way of pressure from the international commu-
nity, in particular from countries with close economic ties 
with Indonesia, for a dramatic improvement in conditions 
inside East Timor. They should not be allowed to prevent the 
forthcoming session of the UN Human Rights Commission 
from censuring Indonesia on a range of human rights issues 
[see separate item]. 
Araujo-Suharto meeting on hold 
In December, President Suharto announced his willing-
ness to meet external East Timorese leaders. This meant in 
fact receiving Abilio Araujo, former Fretilin leader. Araujo 
arrived in Jakarta before Christmas 1994 and told Forum 
Keadilan [No.18/111, 22 Dec. 1995) that he was hoping to 
meet the President after the New Year. Up to the time we 
went to press the meeting had not taken place, however. 
The long delay is indicative of a degree of confusion in 
Jakarta's position vis-a-vis talking with East Timorese. Could 
it be that the Alatas line of agreeing to 'all-inclusive talks' is 
colliding with Suharto's intentions to promote the restrictive 
'reconciliation talks' that have been funded and sponsored by 
his eldest daughter, Mbak Tutut? 
Neves trial hears testimony from Aditjondro 
The trial of Jose Antonio Neves, the East Timorese 
theology graduate, which has been under way for months 
already, heard evidence on 14 December from Indonesian 
academic George Aditjondro. The news of Aditjondro's 
testimony was conveyed directly to T APOL. The trial is 
taking place at the Malang district court, East Java, and has 
been completely ignored by the national press. 
Aditjondro, who himself faces possible prosecution 
because of a lecture he gave at a university in Yogyakarta in 
August on charges that could jail him for 18 months, drew 
comparisons between the struggle of the people of East Timor 
and those of the people of Palestine and the Western Sahara. 
A solution for East Timor can certainly be reached if the UN-
sponsored talks include the resistance leader, Xanana 
Gusmao, he told the court. 
He said that East Timorese students studying in Indonesia 
have come under the influence of their own nationalist 
struggle as well as the nationalist struggle waged by the 
people of Indonesia that led to the proclamation on 17 August 
1945. He likened East Timorese students in Indonesia to 
Indonesians who studied in the Netherlands before the Pacific 
War and drew inspiration there from the Dutch movement for 
its own liberation. 
The session was well attended by East Timorese students 
from several universities in East Java. There was a great deal 
of cheering for Aditjondro and jeering when the prosecutor 
tried, under questioning, to impugn his intentions and 
reliability. 
Six Timorese prisoners on hunger strike 
Six East Timorese prisoners who were tried in Dili after 
the November 1991 Santa Cruz massacre and sentenced 
of terms of up to life, announced early in January that they 
would go on hunger strike from 9 January, the day when talks 
were held in Geneva to resolve the question of East Timor. 
The six men, Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha, Francisco 
Miranda Branco, Satumino da Costa Belo, Jacinto das 
Neves Raimundo Alves, Filomeno da Silva Pereira and 
Juvencio de Jesus Martins, were suddenly transferred from 
Dili to a prison in Semarang in May 1994, shortly before the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial Killings was due to 
visit Dili. As a result, the Special Rapporteur was unable to 
visit them in Central Java and sent a member of his team to 
meet them. 
The men are now being held at Kedungpane Prison, 
Semarang and have made repeated requests to the chief of the 
Prison Service, Baharuddin Lopa, to be returned to Dili. 
Having failed to receive any response, they decided to start a 
hunger strike to back up their demand. 
They made four other demands: the inclusion of resistance 
leader Xanana Gusmao in the talks on East Timor's future, a 
call on Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas to show 
seriousness in his efforts to resolve the question, a call for a 
new investigation of the Santa Cruz massacre, and the return 
of the bodies of all the victims of the massacre to their 
families for a decent burial in accordance with East Timorese 
tradition. 
Late news 
According to Suara Merdeka on 23 January, the hunger 
strike lasted for four days. The prison director stated that he 
was conveying the prisoners' request for transfer back to Dili 
to the prison authorities in Jakarta. 
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BOOK REVIEW 
The True Cost of Conflict, edited by Michael 
Cranna for Saferworld, Earthscan, £ 14.95 hb 
This new study is unique. It is a must for policy and deci-
sion makers all over the world. The conclusions drawn are by 
no means earth-shattering as everybody knows that conflicts 
cause destruction and chaos. But conducting a cost-benefit 
analysis on seven cases, as this study does, is a new depar-
ture. The True Cost of Conflict looks at what conflicts cost 
the countries involved in the conflict, and assesses the impact 
of each conflict on the economies of the Western industrial-
ised nations. By outlining the costs of conflict to the west, the 
researchers aim to alert western voters to the consequences of 
their governments' current approaches to conflict prevention 
and management, as well as to their policies on arms exports. 
Six criteria are used: development; economy; infrastruc-
ture; civil and political rights; environment; and refugees. 
The seven conflicts are well chosen: the Gulf War, Indone-
sia's invasion of East Timor, the civil war in Mozambique, 
the guerrilla war in Peru, Kashmir's independence struggle, 
the civil war in Sudan and the war in former Yugoslavia. The 
conflicts include wars between nations as well as guerrilla 
warfare. The countries they occur in are among the world's 
major powers. Some involve only local combatants while oth-
ers have prompted the outside world to become directly in-
volved. Some have international importance while others 
have remained local with hardly any international reverbera-
tions. 
The key motive of the study, as the editor says, 'is to en-
courage people to look at conflict in new ways. By laying 
bare the true costs and benefits of conflict in a way not at-
tempted before, the book aims to bring new insights to the 
debate on global security. The study looks not only at deaths 
and casualties but also at the economic costs to the countries 
involved as well as their trading and investing partners. 
East Timor is subjected to a fine piece of research by Ian 
Robinson. Using a wide range of background information, he 
concludes that 'the destruction of East Timor 's identity pre-
1975 appears almost total. The people remain traumatised, 
alienated and unhealthy by Indonesian standards, and un-
convinced by the considerable investment Jakarta has in-
jected. .. ' . The cost-benefit analysis is then applied to the 
invader Indonesia, neighbouring Australia, the West and the 
international community. The 24-page chapter is very useful, 
adding valuable arguments for those who seriously want to 
bring the conflict to a just and peaceful end. Some of the costs 
for the international community identified by the report are: 
Repeated abstentions by the US and UK in the voting on 
UN resolutions condemning the invasion, and the UN's in-
ability as a result to do anything about it, has undermined its 
authority; 
Portugal has taken Australia to the International Court of 
Justice over the East Timor Gap Treaty, which it considers as 
being a violation of international law; 
Australia has received 5,000 East Timorese refugees. 
The final chapter presents policy proposals which would 
help forestall conflicts and facilitate early resolutions. One 
obvious proposal is to curb the arms trade, the basic ingredi-
ent of armed conflicts. As the authors convincingly argue, 
action to prevent conflicts is urgent. The cost of doing noth-
ing is simply too high, socially, morally and economically. 
Liem Soei Liong 
STOP Arming 
Indonesia 
a european perspectJVe on arms trad e to a 
m1/1tary regime 
STOP ARMING INDONESIA: A European per-
spective on arms trade to a military regime. 
A pamphlet with chapters on the involvement in the arms 
trade of countries in which the various members of 
ENAAT (European Network Against Arms Trade) are 
based. It also gives an account of the role of the military 
in Indonesia and more generally, discusses the arming of 
Southeast Asia. The booklet is available from CAA T 
(Campaign Against Arms Trade), 11 Goodwin Street, 
London N4 3HQ, Tel. 0171 281 0297. Price£ 5.00, plus 
40p postage (inland) and 64p (Europe). 
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